University of Miami Law Review
Volume 17

Number 4

Article 3

7-1-1963

Municipal Liability for Police Torts: An Analysis of a Strand of
American Legal History
Marshall S. Shapo

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Marshall S. Shapo, Municipal Liability for Police Torts: An Analysis of a Strand of American Legal History,
17 U. Miami L. Rev. 475 (1963)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol17/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR POLICE TORTS: AN
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INTRODUCTION

This paper will analyze the development of a concept in the law
of torts-the concept that a municipality should be responsible for the
torts of its police officers. This story is part of a larger chronicle, the
development of municipal tort liability in general. But the law, as well
as history, is served better by sharp focus on the individual strand.
The general survey may suggest truth, diffused. The spotlight exposes
facets of the truth by its insistence on the particulars-the law of cases.
This is a five-part analysis. It will first examine the great volume of
police tort cases which immunize the city from liability. It will spotlight
the growth of legal reasoning in an historical context, noting the erosion
of doctrinal barriers in some states and the petrifaction of the old ideas
in others. Secondly it will analyze the scholarly attack on government
* Executive Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Student Assistant in Instruction
for Freshmen, University of Miami School of Law; Formerly Instructor in History, University of Miami.
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immunity in general, with special emphasis on the role of one scholar
and his relationship to the intellectual currents of his time.
The third part of the paper will concern the explicit breaking of
the old molds by a growing corps of states since 1957. This will include
several police cases, but also it necessarily will include cases involving
other governmental functions. We shall return exclusively to a policeman
focus by posing as a counterpoint the maintenance of the status quo by
several states in the last decade. The fourth part will present suggestions
of a positive correlation between these recent developments and the
demographic demands of urban society in the mid-twentieth century.
The analysis will then examine recent developments in Florida police
tort cases, which present a fascinating picture of jurisprudence in search
of a new foothold.
It will conclude with an examination of what the author believes
are the lessons to be drawn from this story, for the analyst of the
development of legal history, as well as for those concerned practically
with decision making as advocates and judges.

I. THE POLICEMAN'S LOT AND THE CITY'S IMMUNITY
Ah, take one considerationwith another,
A policeman's lot is not a happy one.1
A. Factual Situations
The problems of municipal liability for the torts of officers are well
represented by the hundreds of cases involving police torts since the
middle of the last century. The policeman is sui generis, a unique kind
of public official. His role in society is celebrated. He is the small boy's
idol, the songwriter's vehicle. He is the omnipresent public official,
touching all our lives. The citizen's intimate acquaintance with the cop
on the corner 2 may have given way to a more impersonal relationship.
But his role in the life of the ordinary citizen, enhanced by the weapons
issued to him by his municipal employer, has remained significant for
more than a century.
Municipal protection from liability for police torts began before the
Civil War. It is perhaps indicative of the historical validity of the doctrine that two of the earliest cases involved the shooting of slaves by
police officers.8 However, Northern courts meted out the same justice in
1. W. S. Gilbert, The Pirates of Penzance, Act II.
2. See Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations,4 ILL. L.Q. 28, 41 (1921).
3. Dargan v. Mayor of Mobile, 31 Ala. 469 (1858); Stewart v. City of New Orleans,
9 La. Ann. 461, 61 Am. Dec. 218 (1854). It is particularly remarkable that Delaware's case
of first impression on the subject-in 1931-brought forth a decision which cited Dargan,
supra, as its principal authority. Kelley v. Mayor of Wilmington, 35 Del. (5 W. W. Harr.) 9,
156 Atd. 867 (1931).
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cases involving allegations of the seizure of a horse,4 and assault, battery
and false imprisonment. 5
Since that time the cases which immunize the municipality with
respect to police torts have ranged over a wide variety of situations.
The most frequent allegations have included false imprisonment 6 and
simple assault and battery. 7 There are many cases involving shootings:
A hospital patient shot by a policeman in the hospital furnace room after
leaving his bed,' a man shot by a policeman guarding a city dump,9 a
killing by an officer trying to take a man into custody, 10 and the wounding
of a bystander by a policeman chasing robbers. 1' Another large group of
cases involves police administration of jails. Plaintiffs have sued for
a failure to provide needed medical attention, 2 for negligence in
connection with jails that burned with prisoners inside,'" for being put
with carriers of smallpox' 4 or venereal disease, 5 and for other mal5a
treatment.1

Another category involves the negligent operation of vehicles. This
has included complaints of a police car which hit a truck and threw it
against the plaintiff's decedent,'" and a strange factual situation in which
the city apparently was doubly immunized in a collision of a patrol
wagon and a fire truck. 7 Recovery against the city has been refused on
allegations that a policeman put a gun where a drunk man could reach
it,'" that a rifle range was negligently supervised,' 9 and that land was
damaged 20 or the flow of a river obstructed 2 by police measures taken in
4. Fox v. The Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103 (Pa. 1841).
5. Buttrick v. City of Lowell, 1 Allen 172, 79 Am. Dec. 721 (Mass. 1861).
6. E.g., Wilson v. Eberle, 15 Alaska 260 (1954); Town of Odell v. Schroeder, 58 Ill.
353 (1871) ; City of Lawton v. Harkins, 34 Okl. 545, 126 Pac. 727 (1912).
7. McSheridan v. City of Talladega, 243 Ala. 162, 8 So.2d 831 (1942); Craig v. City
of Charleston, 180 Ill. 154, 54 N.E. 184 (1899) ; Brown v. City of Shreveport, 129 So.2d
540 (La. App. 1961) ; Simpson v. Poindexter, 241 Miss. 854, 133 So.2d 286 (1961) (arrested
for misdemeanor, plaintiff was beaten so badly that be "ambulates with hemiplegic gait").
8. O'Quin v. Baptist Mem. Hosp., 184 Tenn. 570, 201 S.W.2d 694 (1947).
9. Gonzales v. City of El Paso, 316 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); see also Kelley
v. Mayor of Wilmington, 35 Del. (5 W.W. Harr.) 9, 156 Atl. 867 (1931).
10. Kingfisher v. City of Forsyth, 132 Mont. 39, 314 P.2d 876 (1957).
11. Evans v. Berry, 262 N.Y. 61, 186 N.E. 203 (1933).
12. Valdez v. Amaya, 327 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
13. McAuliffe v. City of Victor, 15 Colo. App. 337, 62 Pac. 231 (1900); Gentry v.
Town of Hot Springs, 227 N.C. 665, 44 S.E.2d 85 (1947); Brown's Adm'r v. Town of
Guyandotte, 34 W. Va. 299, 12 S.E. 707 (1890).
14. Evans v. City of Kankakee, 231 Ill. 223, 83 N.E. 223 (1907).
15. Lewis v. City of Miami, 127 Fla. 426, 173 So. 150 (1937) (municipality held liable).
15a. City of Detroit v. Laughna, 34 Mich. 401 (1876) (plaintiff forced to take cold
bath under improper conditions and suffered exposure in cold cell).
16. Taylor v. City of Berwyn, 372 Ill. 124, 22 N.E.2d 930 (1939).
17. Perez v. City & County of Honolulu, 29 Haw. 656 (1927).
18. Wynkoop v. Mayor of Hagerstown, 159 Md. 194, 150 Atl. 447 (1930).
19. Bucholz v. City of Sioux Falls, 77 S.D. 322, 91 N.W.2d 606 (1958) (dictum).
20. Gillmor v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 180, 89 Pac. 714 (1907).
21. Sehy v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 534, 126 Pac. 691 (1912).
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the search for a drowned boy. Cities also have escaped liability for
slander22 and for the conversion of chattels.28
B. Rationalizations
Municipal immunity for police torts did not develop as a rule without
exceptions,2 4 but the doctrine was applied quite consistently up to the
last decade in almost every state which ruled on the issue. We may now
examine the reasons which the courts have used to immunize the
municipality. These reasons will be presented with close attention to
decisional language and to the sources of precedent which the courts
used. It is, of course, necessary to analyze the underlying currents which
influence legal history, and it is well-known that judicial language is
many times opaque with reference to judicial purpose. But for a starting
point there can be no substitute for a close analysis of what the courts
say they are doing.
The most popular group of reasons for immunity is really just a
set of labels which display a fascination with the abstract political relationships of the municipal corporation. In a case which used typical
language, it was alleged that the plaintiff's decedent died in jail because
of negligent care when he became ill.25 Liability was denied against the
defendant city because, as the court said, a city taking temporary care
of people who have been arrested is performing a "public duty" for
which it receives no "pecuniary benefit"; the city derives no "corporate
advantage" from the confinement.
This idea that there is a dichotomy in the functions of the city
between the "governmental" and the "proprietary" runs all through the
field of municipal tort law, and is recited in many policeman cases.28
An interesting thing about this distinction is that it becomes accepted as
almost an a priori category. The courts eventually find it unnecessary to
recite the distinction between the city as a corporation which seeks profit,
22. Owensby v. Morris, 79 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (circulation of pictures
of the plaintiff to Rogues' Galleries).
23. Tzatzken v. City of Detroit, 226 Mich. 603, 198 N.W. 214 (1924); Boorse v.
Springfield Twp., 377 Pa. 109, 103 A.2d 708 (1954); Fox v. The Northern Liberties, 3
W. & S. 103 (Pa. 1841). See the comment by Pennsylvania's Justice Musmanno
in another case: "[H]orse by horse, the fiction of governmental immunity for the tortious
acts of its agents continues to raise its cacophonous clatter down the highway of law and
justice." Stouffer v. Morrison, 400 Pa. 497, 505, 162 A.2d 378, 382 (1960).
24. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 58 through 63 supra.
25. Kelly v. Cook, 21 R.I. 29, 41 Atl. 571 (1898).
26. City of Miami v. Bethel, 65 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1953) ; Elrod v. City of Daytona Beach,
132 Fla. 214, 180 So. 378 (1938); City of Nampa v. Kibler, 62 Idaho 511, 113 P.2d 411
124, 22 N.E.2d 930 (1939); Lamont v. Stava(1941); Taylor v. City of Berwyn, 372 Ill.
naugh, 129 Minn. 321, 152 N.W. 720 (1915); Ulrich v. City of St. Louis, 112 Mo. 138, 20
S.W. 467 (1892); Lacock v. City of Schenectady, 224 App. Div. 512, 231 N.Y. Supp. 379
(1928), aff'd mem., 251 N.Y. 575, 168 N.E. 433 (1929) ; Bucholz v. City of Sioux Falls, 77
S.D. 322, 91 N.W.2d 606 (1958) (dictum); Harman v. City of Lynchburg, 74 Va. (33 Grat.)
37 (1880) (dictum); Schultz v. City of Milwaukee, 49 Wis. 254, 5 N.W. 342 (1880).
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and the "governmental" agency. 7 A twentieth century tendency to
rubberstamp this dichotomy is a compounded judicial error. It represents
what might be called the tendency of the nineteenth century to make
a principle a concrete thing with an independent existence.28 Once the
principle is thus frozen, it is a simple matter to retreat to the syllogism.
An Arizona case provides a classic example: Immunity exists for the
"governmental" function. Police work is a governmental function.
Therefore, there is no liability.2 9
The governmental-proprietary dichotomy is extended by a closely
allied theory. Illustrative is the case of an Oklahoma peddler who
brought an action for false imprisonment." The court denied liability
because, it said, police regulations were made and enforced not in the
interest of the city in its "corporate capacity," but in the "interest of
the public." The appointment of policemen was said to be devolved on
cities by the legislature "as a convenient mode of exercising a function
of government."'"
This theory becomes exalted when the magic word "sovereignty" is
invoked. The guns boomed at Fort Sumter the year that a Massachusetts
court, in an oft-cited decision, told a plaintiff that he could not recover
for assault and battery and false arrest because
The authority to enact by-laws is delegated to the city by the
sovereign power, and the exercise of the authority gives to
27. The Tennessee cases are quite instructive in this respect. The landmark Tennessee
decision, in a false imprisonment case decided in 1866, was already "satisfied from principle
and authority" that a "municipal corporation is not liable for the wrongful acts of its
officers." Pesterfield v. Vickers, 43 Tenn. 205, 213 (1866). The general doctrine here
entered the Tennessee policeman cases. This Pesterfield case can be traced forward to a
1930 case, Combs v. City of Elizabethton, 161 Tenn. 363, 31 S.W.2d 691, which says that
Pesterfield settled the issue, and then to a 1960 case, which cites the 1930 case, and says that
"The choosing of agents for the enforcement of public laws is a governmental function,
and a municipality cannot be held liable about such matters." Mayor of Morristown v.
Inman, 47 Tenn. App. 685, 342 S.W.2d 71.
28. For one of the classic critiques, see William James' essay Humanism and Truth
in PRAGMATISM AND Four RELATED ESSAYS SELECTED FROM THE MEANINo OF TRUTH 375-77

(1947).
29. City of Phoenix v. Greer, 43 Ariz. 214, 29 P.2d 1062 (1934). Another good example
is Boorse v. Springfield Twp., 377 Pa. 109, 103 A.2d 708 (1954).
30. City of Lawton v. Harkins, 34 Okl. 545, 126 Pac. 727 (1912). The frequency of
peddler cases in this area is another index to the antiquity of the rule from a standpoint
of socio-legal history. See also text accompanying note 3 supra.
31. The same rationale was used in Walker v. Tucker, 131 Colo. 198, 280 P.2d 649
(1955); McCain v. Andrews, 139 Fla. 391, 190 So. 616 (1939); Culver v. City of Streator,
130 Ill. 238, 22 N.E. 810 (1889) ; Calwell v. City of Boone, 51 Iowa 687, 2 N.W. 614 (1879)
(see also Trescott v. City of Waterloo, 26 Fed. 592 (N.D. Iowa 1885)); Wynkoop v.
Mayor of Hagerstown, 159 Md. 194, 150 Atl. 447 (1930) ; McConnell v. City of St. Charles,
204 S.W. 1075 (Mo. 1918); Tomlin v. Hildreth, 65 N.J.L. 438, 47 Atl. 649 (1900); Rusher
v. City of Dallas, 83 Tex. 151, 18 S.W. 333 (1892); Gillmor v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah
180, 89 Pac. 714 (1907). See also Grumbine v. Mayor of Washington, 2 MacArth. 578, 29
Am. Rep. 626 (D.C. 1876).
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such enactments the same force and effect as if they had been
passed directly by the legislature. 2
Three years before, Alabama used the term "imperium in imperio" in a
slave-killing case 3 to describe the municipal government's relation to the
police power. The courtly flavor of the language bespeaks the antiquity
of the concept, which was popular under various shades of labels, both
North and South, and remains popular in our own time. 4
A fourth offshoot of the political-theory arguments, closely related
to the "sovereignty" idea, is illustrated by an old Kansas false imprisonment case. 85 The court there reasoned that policemen were not agents
or servants of the city, but "public servants of the state." This idea, with
variations based on special circumstances in the formal distribution of
power within a state, was quite popular before the turn of the century8 6
and has survived into this decade. 7
The atmosphere of doctrine, the air of the nineteenth century intellectual structure that is created by this theorizing, is reinforced by the
frank laissez-faire implications of a few decisions. A plaintiff in antebellum Pennsylvania complained that the chief of police of the defendant,
an incorporated district, had seized his horse illegally. The court replied
that the policeman "must be regarded as having done the trespass of his
own will, and he alone must be looked to for compensation, by the party
injured. ' 7 a This atomistic view of society, emphasizing only the duty of
the individual tortfeasor, refusing to recognize a responsibility in his
governmental employer, pervades several decisions.87b
32. Buttrick v. City of Lowell, I Allen 172, 174, 79 Am. Dec. 721, 723 (Mass. 1861).
33. Dargan v. Mayor of Mobile, 31 Ala. 469, 473 (1858).
34. One of the latest cases is Kingfisher v. City of Forsyth, 132 Mont. 39, 314 P.2d 876
(1957), which speaks of an "arm of the state." Other examples: Stewart v. City of New
Orleans, 9 La. Ann. 461, 61 Am. Dec. 218 (1854); Tzatzken v. City of Detroit, 226 Mich.
603, 198 N.W. 214 (1924); Kelly v. Cook, 21 R.I. 29, 41 At. 571 (1898); Brown's Adm'r v.
Town of Guyandotte, 34 W. Va. 299, 12 S.E. 707 (1890). See also McAuliffe v. City of
Victor, 15 Colo. App. 337, 62 Pac. 231 (1900); Pollock's Adm'r v. City of Louisville, 13
Bush 221, 26 Am. Rep. 260 (Ky. 1877); Woodhull v. Mayor of New York, 150 N.Y. 450,
44 N.E. 1038 (1896). For Mr. Justice Holmes' articulation of this idea, and citation to an
adverse view, see note 119 infra.
35. Peters v. City of Lindsborg, 40 Kan. 654, 20 Pac. 490 (1889).
36. City of Detroit v. Laughna, 34 Mich. 401 (1876) (state law adopted the house of
correction as a public prison and there was a state representative on the governing board) ;
McKay v. City of Buffalo, 9 Hun. 401 (N.Y. 1876) (police department responsible to a
board of commissioners). See also City of Lafayette v. Timberlake, 88 Ind. 330 (1882);
Buttrick v. City of Lowell, 1 Allen 172, 79 Am. Dec. 721 (Mass. 1861).
37. Stouffer v. Morrison, 400 Pa. 497, 162 A.2d 378 (1960).
37a. Fox v. The Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103, 106 (Pa. 1841).
37b. Pesterfield v. Vickers, 43 Tenn. 205, 213 (1866) ("If they [police officers] violate
the law, they are personally responsible"); Harrison v. City of Columbus, 44 Tex. 418
(1876) (court noted that those who performed arrest could have been held personally
liable) ; Franklin v. City of Seattle, 112 Wash. 671, 192 Pac. 1015 (1920) (guilt on charge
of confinement for more than a year on false charge of having contagious disease would
be the guilt of the officers alone).
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One particularly comfortable reason for immunizing the city has
been to say that the law is "well-settled." That particular phrase occurs
in surprisingly early decisions. 8 This approach inflicted perhaps its
worst indignity in a 1905 West Virginia case involving an allegation that
the plaintiff's seven-year-old son had died from incarceration in the city's
"filthy and unsanitary prison." The court said that the whole affair was
"difficult to conceive," but that "the hardship of the case cannot be
permitted to overthrow fundamental principles of law.""
Courts which lacked precedent in their own jurisdictions have found
no pain in immunizing cities because of what other jurisdictions have
said. Thus, an 1875 Georgia decision absolves the city of responsibility
for its policemen's alleged false imprisonment by saying that the governmental-private distinction is "almost universal," and cites Buttrick v.
City of Lowell, a landmark Massachusetts case of 1861.4 o This illustration compels an observation on the cross-sterilization of legal concepts
from one state to another in our federal system. One is impressed, reading these cases, by the evolution of an interlocking directorate of precedents, laid down for the most part in the nineteenth century, which
provided a ready-made haven for judges in search of certainty. Thus, we
find the Oklahoma court in 1912 holding that a peddler cannot recover
against the city for false imprisonment, 1 with a citation to the Alabama
slave-killing case, 2 as well as to decisions from Georgia, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri and Pennsylvania. 3
38. Gullikson v. McDonald, 62 Minn. 278, 64 N.W. 812 (1895); Mcllhenney v. City
of Wilmington, 127 N.C. 146, 37 S.E. 187 (1900). I say "surprisingly early"; but about a
decade after these two cases, Dean Pound was noting a "certain ballast of mysterious
technicality" in the law. Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 607 (1908). If
for Pound the hour was late for a change at that time, we may ask what he would say to
the same use of "well settled" within the last decade. Taulli v. Gregory, 223 La. 195, 65
So.2d 312 (1953).
39. Brown's Adm'r v. Town of Guyandotte, 34 W. Va. 299, 12 S.E. 707 (1890) (Emphasis
added). See also Perez v. City and County of Honolulu, 29 Haw. 656 (1927) ("It has too
long been the law to be now questioned") ; Craig v. City of Charleston, 180 Ill.
154, 54 N.E.
184 (1899)

("familiar rule of law").

40. Cook v. Mayor of Macon, 54 Ga. 468 (1875), citing Buttrick v. City of Lowell,
1 Allen 172, 79 Am. Dec. 721 (Mass. 1861). Similarly, see Simpson v. City of Whatcom,

33 Wash. 392, 74 Pac. 577 (1903)

("great weight of authority").

41. City of Lawton v. Harkins, 34 Okl. 545, 126 Pac. 727 (1912).

42. Dargan v. Mayor of Mobile, 31 Ala. 469 (1858).
43. Cook v. Mayor of Macon, 54 Ga. 468 (1875)

(illegal arrest); Culver v. City of

Streator, 130 Ill. 238, 22 N.E. 810 (1889)
(negligence respecting enforcement of dog
ordinance) ; Town of Odell v. Schroeder, 58 Il1. 353 (1871) (false imprisonment) ; Blake v.
City of Pontiac, 49 Ill. App. 543 (1893) (false imprisonment and battery) ; Calwell v. City
of Boone, 51 Iowa 687, 2 N.W. 614 (1879); Peters v. City of Lindsborg, 40 Kan. 654, 20

Pac. 490 (1889) (false imprisonment); Pollock's Adm'r v. City of Louisville, 13 Bush 221,
26 Am. Rep. 260 (Ky. 1877) (false imprisonment); Buttrick v. City of Lowell, 1 Allen
172, 79 Am. Dec. 721 (Mass. 1861) (assault and battery and false arrest) ; Worley v.
Inhabitants of Town of Columbia, 88 Mo. 106 (1885) (false imprisonment); Elliot v. City
of Philadelphia, 75 Pa. 347 (1874)

arrest).

(letting horse run away and be killed after plaintiff's
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Over and over the courts drone the magic names of these cases, a
litany which sounds well into the twentieth century." And then we turn
to a 1947 decision of the Municipal Court of Appeals for the capital of
the nation. It cites Buttrick v. City of Lowell,45 vintage Lincoln, for the
proposition that there was no ratification when the District of Columbia
auhorized its corporation counsel to defend policemen against a charge
that they broke into the plaintiff's house and placed another in posses46

sion 1

A great historian has said that the American people rose admirably
to the emergency presented by "the phenomenon of a great population
everywhere clotting into towns," and that there developed in place of
rural neighborliness a spirit of "impersonal social responsibility which
devoted itself, with varying earnestness and success, to questions of pure
water, sewage disposal and decent housing for the poor."47 He has also
noted, however, the "lack of unity, balance, planfulness in the advances
that were made," and that urban progress was "experimental, uneven,
often accidental." 4 An examination of the legal history of this time,
centered on municipal responsibility for police torts, reveals that the
"impersonal social responsibility" is lacking in this area, and that progress in the law was in fact stultified by the comfort provided by a rule.
It is not only because fresh thought has been choked by historical
dust that liability has been denied. Missouri, prodded by a thoughtful
plaintiff's attorney, took a critical look at immunity while considering an
allegation based on a policeman's assault in the city jail.49 But the court
refused to abrogate the doctrine. It noted that immunity had begun with
"the abhorrent theory that the king can do no wrong," but said that the
old concept had new reasons, centered on the "unlimited possibilities of
the wasteful and dishonest dissipation of public funds."
This financial argument was one of the oldest rationalizations for
immunity. Indeed, it was one of those used by Lord Kenyon in the
hoary English case of Russell v. Men of Devon,"0 which serves as a
44. For examples of cross-sterilization by the cases mentioned, on both sides of 1900,
see the following: Tzatzken v. City of Detroit, 226 Mich. 603, 198 N.W. 214 (1924) ; Hinds
v. City of Hannibal, 212 S.W.2d 401 (Mo. 1948); McKay v. City of Buffalo, 9 Hun. 401
(N.Y. 1876); McIlhenney v. City of Wilmington, 127 N.C. 146, 37 S.E. 187 (1900); Kelly
v. Cook, 21 R.I. 29, 41 Atl. 571 (1898); Owensby v. Morris, 79 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App.
1935) ; Simpson v. City of Whatcom, 33 Wash. 392, 74 Pac. 577 (1903).
The work probably most-cited in the cases is Dillon, MUTNICIPAL CoRPoaTIoN s (several editions, beginning 1872). Later, many courts cited Shearman and Redfield, LAW OF
NEGL GENCE (first published 1913).
45. Supra note 43.
46. Savage v. District of Columbia, 52 A.2d 120 (Mun. Ct. App. 1947). This case cited
a District case of 1876, Grumbine v. City of Washington, 2 MacArth. 578, 29 Am. Rep.
626, which in turn cited Buttrick, supra note 43.
47. Arthur M. Schlesinger, THE RISE OF THE CITY, 1878-1898, at 120 (1933).
48. Ibid.
49. Hinds v. City of Hannibal, 212 S.W.2d 401 (Mo. 1948).
50. 2 Term Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
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popular scapegoat for present-day attacks on immunity. It is very
interesting, however, that Devon was an unincorporated area, and that
Lord Kenyon emphasized that there was "no corporation fund." It is
interesting because near the middle of the twentieth century we find the
financial argument, presumably tacitly at the roots of many early American decisions, being stated baldly with reference to the modern municipal
corporation. 1 It is somewhat curious that the firm establishment of
insurance, which has been utilized in some statutory areas to broaden
municipal liability for certain torts,5 2 should have been paralleled in
relatively recent decisions by such explicit declarations of the financial
rationale for immunity.
An old Illinois decision exemplifies one of the neatest arguments
against municipal liability. The plaintiff charged false imprisonment.
The court impaled him on one horn of a dilemma by saying in effect that
there were two kinds of acts which a town constable could commit-lawful
and unlawful-and that the town was not liable for the "unauthorized,
illegal and oppressive acts of the officer. ' 53 This sounds very much akin
to the agency conception of "scope of the employment," although more
often than not the courts do not speak explicitly in agency language.
The other horn of the dilemma was fashioned by the Pennsylvania court
when the plaintiff alleged that policemen had killed his valuable racing
mare, stuck in a culvert, without giving him a chance to extricate her.
The court first premised that if the policemen were not acting in the
scope of their employment, the defendant townships would not be liable.
Then it used the magic of subsuming the 'police power" under the
"governmental" label, and said that if the policemen were exercising
54
that power, the townships would not be liable anyway.
It should be said that the courts recognized even during the early
years of the reign of immunity that something seemed wrong. A series
of prison cases reflects this recognition.55 For instance, the Rhode Island
51. In addition to the Hinds case, supra note 49, see Gentry v. Town of Hot Springs,
227 N.C. 665, 44 S.E.2d 85 (1947). The Gentry court said that although there were "fine
distinctions" in the decisions, "the doctrine itself is regarded as essential, else it would be
impossible to say where the liability of a municipal corporation would end, or how heavy a
burden might be imposed on those who sustain its existence." For a less obvious reference
to this rationale, see Lucas v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 476, 75 P.2d 599 (1938).
52. See, e.g., text with note 177 infra.
53. Town of Odell v. Schroeder, 58 Ill. 353 (1871).
54. Q.E.D. Boorse v. Springfield Twp., 377 Pa. 109, 103 A.2d 708 (1954). Other decisions which use one or both horns of the dilemma: Brown v. Town of Eustis, 92 Fla. 931,
110 So. 873 (1926); City of Nampa v. Kibler, 62 Idaho 511, 113 P.2d 411 (1941); Peters
v. City of Lindsborg, 40 Kan. 654, 20 Pac. 490 (1889); Buttrick v. City of Lowell, 1
Allen 172, 79 Am. Dec. 721 (Mass. 1861), Connelly v. City of Sedalia, 222 Mo. App. 109,
2 S.W.2d 632 (1928); Elliott v. City of Philadelphia, 75 Pa. 347 (1874); Royce v. Salt
Lake City, 15 Utah 401i 49 Pac. 290 (1897).
55. Kelly v. Cook, 21 R.I. 29, 41 Atl. 571 (1898). To the same effect, see Gray v.
Mayor of Griffin, 111 Ga. 361, 36 SE. 792 (1900); and Brown's Adm'r v. Town of Guyandotte, 34 W. Va. 299, 12 S.E. 707 (1890).
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court, confronted with a plaintiff who died in jail because of negligent
care, "presumed" that "common dictates of humanity will prompt those
in charge of municipal affairs ... to properly provide for persons under
arrest." But it said bluntly that liability in this kind of case had "not
yet been incorporated into our law"-citing a Minnesota case56 to prove
its point. There is a particularly mournful quality about these cases.
Imprisoned by a man-made conceptual structure, the courts possess the
legal tools to break it down, but lack the intellectual climate to permit
this. The problem becomes more explicitly recognized during the last
twenty years, when the judicial riposte of the immunity courts is that
the matter is for legislation, not judicial action.5"
C. Cracks in the Wall of Immunity
It is now relevant to consider inroads which have been made on
municipal immunity from responsibility for police torts. Perhaps the
earliest and most popular wedge was based on the idea that the street
was a repository of "corporate" rather than "governmental" functions.
Thus, well before 1900, Missouri granted recovery to a plaintiff who fell
against the iron trapdoors which covered a cellar entering into a police
station."' The court said that while the law was "well settled" that a
municipal corporation is not liable for police torts committed in the exercise of governmental functions, this principle could not aid the defendant, for there is a "unique duty of the city to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition." Although Missouri hairlined its
distinction later at a police station elevator,"' the talisman of the street
has saved more than one plaintiff, for example, convicts working on
streets6 0
56. Gullikson v. McDonald, 62 Minn. 278, 64 N.W. 812 (1895).
57. See text and notes 183-184 infra.
58. Carrington v. City of St. Louis, 89 Mo. 208, 1 S.W. 240 (1886).
59. Pearson v. Kansas City, 331 Mo. 885, 55 S.W.2d 485 (1932). Accord, Wilcox v. City
of Rochester, 190 N.Y. 137, 82 N.E. 1119 (1907). See also City of Bay Minette v. Quinley,
263 Ala. 188, 82 So.2d 192 (1955) (no liability for negligent maintenance of stairs to police
offices).
60. See three successive versions of the same Alabama case: Hillman v. City of
Anniston, 214 Ala. 522, 108 So. 539 (1926); Id., 216 Ala. 661, 114 So. 55 (1927); City of
Anniston v. Hillman, 220 Ala. 505, 126 So. 169 (1930). Accord, Ballard v. City of Tampa,
124 Fla. 457, 168 So. 654 (1936). Compare Shinnick v. City of Marshalltown, 137 Iowa
72, 114 N.W. 542 (1908), the ancestor of another twist: Liability granted when a policeman
stretched a rope across the street. Accord, Crow v. City of San Antonio, 157 Tex. 250, 301
S.W.2d 628 (1957) (helping children attend Bible class). See also the fascinating decision
in City of Austin v. Daniels, 160 Tex. 628, 335 S.W.2d 753 (1960), wherein the tangents of
"governmental" and "corporate" bump resoundingly, in a 5 to 4 decision (city liable for
injuries from slip-and-fall on fresh paint on street parking line). But cf. Crowley v. City
of Raymond, 198 Wash. 432, 88 P.2d 858 (1939) (immunity via governmental function
when rope used to help children sled) ; and Haney v. Town of Rainelle, 125 W. Va. 397, 25
S.E.2d 207 (1943). In the latter case, the plaintiff police sergeant fell into a ditch at the
end of a walkway leading from the police station to the street. The court rejected the idea
that the walkway and approaches to the jail constituted a "street or sidewalk or alley."
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Various courts have fashioned other exquisite distinctions to support
plaintiffs' verdicts. One of the most remarkable of these was a Mississippi
distinction which allowed recovery for injuries caused by the negligent
driving of the city's police car, because the police were required by several
ordinances to report street defects." The court said that it should not
have to "unscramble" the governmental and proprietary ingredients of a
policeman's duties. Iowa granted recovery when a city's police car injured
the plaintiff while it was hauling policemen to their beats, saying that this
activity partook of the "general or corporate business of the city,"
using the analogy of a policeman sweeping out headquarters.62 Further,
two states have made the city liable in cases relating to the operation of
garages to repair police cars.6"
Other courts, however, have drawn distinctions equally fine for
immunity's sake. Thus, Alabama, having granted recovery to a convict
killed by police brutality while working on the street,6 4 dismissed the
case of a convict shot by a prison guard while trying to flee a road gang.
No longer was he engaged in the performance of his corporate work,
but a "convict bent on escape." 65 Similarly, a policeman cleaning out his
car who tosses out a chunk of wood which hits the plaintiff is performing
a "governmental function," 66 and city operations of a quarry6" and a
workhouse6 8 have been called governmental.
61. City of Meridian v. Beeman, 175 Miss. 527, 166 So. 757 (1936). This case was
distinguished in an immunity holding just two years ago, when the policeman was not
required by ordinance to make reports on the street-even though he testified he looked
for such defects just as an ordinary citizen would. City of Hattiesburg v. Buckalew, 240
Miss. 323, 127 So.2d 428 (1961).
62. Jones v. Sioux City, 185 Iowa 1178, 170 N.W. 445 (1919).
63. Levin v. City of Omaha, 102 Neb. 328, 167 N.W. 214 (1918). In this case the
plaintiff's decedent was killed by a speeding car driven by a boy sent to get an inner tube
by the foreman of the police garage, who was carried on the payroll as a police officer.
Levin was found persuasive in Oklahoma City v. Foster, 118 Okl. 120, 247 Pac. 80 (1926)
(police chief in charge of garage ordered officer to use motorcycle, though knowing it was
defective; another officer hurt as a result). See also City of Houston v. Wolverton, 270
S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), aff'd, 154 Tex. 325, 277 S.W.2d 101 (1955) (liability
held on basis of "proprietary" function when car in which plaintiffs were riding was hit
by milk inspector (normally "governmental" function) on way for repair at city garage).
64. The Hillman series of cases, note 60 supra.
65. City of Birmingham v. Brock, 242 Ala. 382, 6 So.2d 499 (1942).
66. Sykes v. City of Berwyn, 320 Ill. App. 440, 51 N.E.2d 587 (1943). Compare the
word-splitting in Berger v. City of New York, 260 App. Div. 402, 22 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (1940),
aff'd, 285 N.Y. 724, 34 N.E.2d 894 (1941). A statute provided that cities should be liable
for the negligence of persons operating municipally owned vehicles while in the scope of
their employment. See N.Y. MuNic. LAW § 50-a (1954). The defendant's policeman saw an
unoccupied auto with its keys in the ignition, commandeered it to chase suspects, and
drove into the pushcart of the plaintiff's decedent, killing him. The court said that
"municipally owned" did not include "commandeered," and denied recovery.
67. Bell v. City of Cincinnati, 80 Ohio St. 1, 88 N.E. 128 (1909) (police sergeant
working in quarry had not been warned about what might happen when he broke open a
box of caps).
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D. A Trio of Case Histories
The analysis thus far has considered policeman cases by categorizing
fact situations and by scrutinizing the reasons which the courts have used
to immunize the municipality. It is useful now to examine the policeman
strand as it has developed in three states which now have fully exorcised
the immunity rule in police cases, or at least have broadened it considerably. This development is instructive because, set against the
analytical approach which has occupied the first part of this paper, it
presents in graphic focus a picture of functional jurisprudence at work.
This section will bring these states up to the eve of the complete breakthrough against immunity, a story that is reserved for another section.
1.

FLORIDA

Florida was the first state to eliminate explicitly the governmentalproprietary distinction, thus imposing liability, 9 and presents the story
in its classic form. Florida policeman cases must be seen against a background which began with a finding of liability in 1850, an extremely early
date for this kind of liberality, in a street defect case, decided on a
"nuisance" theory. 70 The background also includes a fire-engine case in
1922 in which the court granted recovery, with the notation that under
the commission plan, a city was "a large quasi-public corporation," concerned with the management of properties "not of the state, but of the
or city, which are managed for financial adpeople of the community
'71
vantage and profit.
Now the battle lines formed for the policeman cases and the struggle
began. A judgment was sustained in favor of a city in 1926 when a
policeman was alleged to have struck the plaintiff while arresting him,72
but the "street" rationale supported a recovery a decade later when the
plaintiff's decedent, a convict, was forced to work the streets while he
was sick." Following closely on this case, the bars of immunity dropped
in a jail situation. The plaintiff claimed he had contracted a venereal
disease because of the negligent failure of jailers to segregate another
prisoner who was infected. He recovered on the basis of a venereal
disease-control statute, but under a dictum which said that the keeping
of a jail included "corporate as well as governmental functions." 4
68. Ulrich v. City of St. Louis, 112 Mo. 138, 20 S.W. 466 (1892)

(plaintiff ordered to

hitch up mules, one of which proved savagely uncooperative).
69. South Carolina also has rejected the distinction, for the sake of immunity-a
sensible approach to categorization, if not to public policy. Irvine v. Town of Greenwood,
89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911).

70. City of Tallahassee v. Fortune, 3 Fla. 19 (1850).
71. Kaufman v. City of Tallahassee, 84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697 (1922). The incineration of
fire department immunity was officially completed by 1935, when the plaintiff's right to
maintain a suit based on injuries from a high-pressure water hose was considered "wellsettled." Swindal v. City of Jacksonville, 119 Fla. 338, 161 So. 383 (1935).
72. Brown v. Town of Eustis, 92 Fla. 931, 110 So. 873 (1926).
73. Ballard v. City of Tampa, 124 Fla. 457, 168 So. 654 (1936).
74. Lewis v. City of Miami, 127 Fla. 426, 173 So. 150 (1937).
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However, the "governmental function" rubric bolstered judgments
of immunity in a quick succession of three cases, two involving assault
and false imprisonment,75 and one for malicious prosecution. 71 It is

interesting that in one of these cases the court remarked that its "sense
of justice" was touched, but said that it must "follow the law as it is
established. 7 And to prove just how well the law was established, the
court followed with a short and almost genial review of the common-law
origins of the doctrine in the theory that the king could do no wrong,
without much indication that there was anything wrong with the doctrine
as a legal creature. Nowhere are better represented the conflicting currents of agitation produced by inequity and of satisfaction engendered
by a rule.
The police immunity front remained quiet in Florida over the span
of World War II. But in 1946 the court said, without dissent, that a
city must pay when a police car hits a child, while an officer is bringing
a prisoner to the station.7 7a Judge Barns, speaking for the court, emphasized that making the city liable would provide "adequate compensation" to the victim and also "spread the loss." He added that this result
"may be sounder justice." The opinion also attacked "attempted classifications" which "failed to classify," and then indicated a possible new
and valid classification-"an abandonment of any distinction between
proprietary and governmental functions when the delict [is] by means
of an automobile.1 771 Thus, a fairly substantial precedent was added

quietly to the rind of Florida law.
There then exploded a brace of cases in 1953, involving an alleged
battery,78 and negligence in allowing a prisoner to be burned to death. 79
These decisions involved bitterly divided courts.80 The majority in City
of Miami v. Bethel s0 sounded the old litany when it said that policemen
alleged to have beaten the plaintiff were engaged in a purely governmental function under the "doctrine" as "derived from the common law
which was adopted by the Legislature.""'
The minority in both Bethel and Williams v. Green Cove Springs, a
75. Kennedy v. City of Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 675, 182 So. 229 (1938); Elrod v..
City of Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 24, 180 So. 378 (1938).
76. McCain v. Andrews, 139 Fla. 391, 190 So. 616 (1939).
77. Kennedy v. City of Daytona Beach, supra note 75. See also note 55 supra and
accompanying text.
77a. City of Avon Park v. Giddens, 158 Fla. 130, 27 So.2d 825 (1946). (four-man
panel, no dissents).
77b. Id. at 133, 27 So.2d at 826, citing Kaufman v. City of Tallahassee, supra note 71.
78. City of Miami v. Bethel, 65 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1953).
79. Williams v. City of Green Cove Springs, 65 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1953).
80. Two dissents plus a special concurring opinion by Hobson, J., which amounted to
a dissent on the point of immunity, in Bethel, supra note 78; four to three in Williams,
supra note 79.
80a. 65 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1953).
81. Id. at 35.
81a. 65 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1953) (the majority opinion here was a per curiam, one para-
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the jail case, set down in crisp outline a galaxy of reasons which now
are becoming new law all over America:
1. The "distinguishing characteristic" of the common law is its
adaptability to changing social and economic conditions-Justice Terrell,
dissenting, in Bethel.
2. Courts may overturn court-made law "when the reasons for prior
decisions are unsound and tend to defeat rather than administer justice"
-Justice Hobson, concurring, in Bethel.
wrong there is a remedy-Justice Terrell, dissenting,
3. For every
2

in Williams.1

4. The magic immunization of "governmental function" is explicitly
attacked: "When a governmental function is performed in a negligent
manner . . . the municipality may be held liable"-Justice Terrell,

dissenting, in Williams."5
5. Simple justice is emphasized, with the caustic remark that it is
doubtful that a bereaved widow could "appreciate the justice of the
law" which denies compensation because of the negligence of a "public,
rather than a private, servant."-Justice Hobson, dissenting, in Williams.84
When the smoke of battle had cleared in 1953, immunity still stood
as Florida law, but it was clear that the siege had begun."
2. ILLINOIS
Illinois presents a development interesting for both similarities and
contrasts. The policeman cases from 1871 to 1939 sound a monotonous
graph affair, citing Lewis v. City of Miami, supra note 74, and Elrod v. City of Daytona
Beach, supra note 75).
82. Justice Terrell was paraphrasing closely the language of FLA. CONST. DECL. OF
RIGHTS § 4: "All courts in this state shall be open, so that every person for every injury
done him . . . shall have remedy. . . ." However, he did not consider it necessary to
decide that this provision was "self-executing" against the city, because of his belief that
the negligent performance of a governmental function was sufficient to create liability.
83. Compare this with Justice Terrell's reasoning in Bethel, supra note 78, which
involved the beating of a prisoner. Justice Terrell there emphasized that "by no stretch
of the imagination" was the policeman "performing a governmental function," noting that
the purpose of the Federal Fifth Amendment was to put an end to third degree confessions.
84. Compare the majority's admission that its "sense of justice" was touched in
Kennedy, text accompanying note 77 supra. The development of these abstractions is
fascinating to trace, as they move from balm for the pangs of judicial conscience of a
majority (Kennedy, supra), to offensive weapons for dissenters (Williams, supra note 79),
and finally to rationalizations for a new majority (Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96
So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957), discussed in detail at notes 145-48 infra).
85. A short period of quiescence is indicated by Britt v. City of Ocala, 65 So.2d 753
(Fla. 1953), decided the same year as Bethel, supra note 78, and Williams, supra note 79.
Justice Terrell wrote the short opinion for a four-man panel, citing Williams as controlling.
In 1955, Wilford v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 79 So.2d 516 (Fla. 1955) cited Bethel as
controlling. See also Woodford v. City of St. Petersburg, 84 So.2d 25 (1955).
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leitmotif: First, a town cannot be liable for unlawful acts.86 By the turn of
the century, the defense of "governmental function" becomes a "familiar
rule of law."'8 7 Then, the plaintiff is in effect told to complain to the
legislature. 8 But by 1943, a factual situation arose close to the line between "governmental" and "proprietary," 9 and an Illinois appellate
court was sufficiently moved by the strength of the attack on immunity
to note that the rule had, indeed, been criticized. However, because the
rule was "old and well-established," it was retained. Thus stood Illinois
policeman law by World War II: The doctrinal language remained firm
as ever, but there were ideas abroad in the land, and the judges knew it.
3.

NEW YORK

New York, an early parent of the governmental-proprietary distinction,9" developed liability in a fascinating series of cases. The first
policeman case worthy of note for these purposes denied recovery on the
plaintiff's allegation that he was injured by a police bullet fired in an
attempt to shoot a mad dog.9 The court noted in this case that other
courts had been troubled in their attempt to articulate the rationale for
immunity. The attempt to hold the city liable, the court said with reference to the usual interlocking directorate of precedents, was "denied
by the common judgment of men, without, perhaps, the ability to put
into clear language the grounds" of distinction from cases where the city
is liable. The court's specific rationale for immunizing the city in this
case apparently was the fact that the police department was responsible
to a board of police commissioners, which led to the conclusion that
police were "in no sense" the "agents or servants of the city."
Governmental function now stood as a bar to recovery in a variety
of New York cases for half a century.91 a But then the Court of Appeals
86. Town of Odell v. Schroeder, 58 Ill. 353 (1871).

87. Craig v. City of Charleston, 180 Ill. 154, 54 N.E. 184 (1899). See also City of
Chicago v. Williams, 182 Ill. 135, 55 N.E. 123 (1899), and Evans v. City of Kankakee, 231

Ill. 223, 83 N.E. 223 (1907). In the latter case, the plaintiff was a phone operator who was
employed in the same building as the defendant city's calaboose. She alleged damages
resulting from smallpox, which she said she contracted from the fumes of a victim's clothes,
burned by police officers. The court's denial of recovery should be compared with the
Lewis case in Florida, note 74 supra and accompanying text.
88. Taylor v.

City of Berwyn,

372 Ill. 124,

22 N.E.2d 930

(1939)

(no

liability

"unless such action is authorized by statute"). It should be pointed out that during this
time span Illinois had granted recovery, inter alia, on a rather tangential tie-up between
a trash-burner and streets and sidewalks, "not only because of our own decisions, but by

the better reason," and because the result is "more just." Roumbos v. City of Chicago, 332
Ill. 70, 163 N.E. 361 (1928).
89. Sykes v. City of Berwyn, 320 Ill. App. 440, 51 N.E.2d 587

(1943)

(police chief

cleaning squad car tosses chunk of wood which hits plaintiff on sidewalk).
90. See Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. 1842).
91. McKay v. City of Buffalo, 9 Hun. 401 (N.Y. 1876).
91a. Lacock v. City of Schenectady, 224 App. Div. 512, 231 N.Y. Supp. 379 (1928),
aff'd mem., 251 N.Y. 575, 168 N.E. 433 (1929) (plaintiff's decedent killed by police motorcycle); Wilcox v. City of Rochester, 190 N.Y. 137, 82 N.E. 1119 (1907) (fall into elevator
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upheld an award by the New York City Board of Estimate for a bullet
wound sustained by a bystander from the revolver of a policeman chasing robbers." One may note the similarity of this case to the one in
which liability was originally denied. It should be said that this case involved a statutory provision which empowered the city to "pay or
compromise

claims, equitably payable

. . .

though

not constituting

obligations legally binding upon it." Judge Pound found that payment by
the city under a resolution passed by its Board was not a gift, as the
Appellate Division had found, but "the legitimate recognition of an equitable claim."
Apart from this holding of liability in a statutory context, the case
is noteworthy for two reasons. One was the frank notation by the court
of "the fact that in the crowded -streets of a great city police officers may
shoot at fugitives . . . and . . . accidental injuries to people on the

street may result."9 It was not too often at that time that the courts
recognized, with such specific, graphic reference to urban reality, the
need for an expanding concept of the law with respect to municipal tort
liability. The second distinction of this case was that an amicus brief
was written by Edwin M. Borchard of Yale, the great gadfly of municipal immunity whose contributions are discussed in Part II of this paper.
The destruction of immunity proceeded in instructive stages over the
next quarter century in New York, aided by two statutes. One of these
statutes provided for municipal liability when a "municipally owned
vehicle" or "other facility" caused injuries, if the operator were acting
in the scope of his municipal duties." The court refused to find that a
commandeered private car was a "municipally owned vehicle" in 1940,11
but it had no qualms about finding a police horse to be a "facility" five
years later.96 And in the police horse case, the court noted that the
plaintiff could have relied on another statute. This was the notable
Section Eight of the Court of Claims Act, which provided:
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same
well in police building); Woodhull v. Mayor of New York, 150 N.Y. 450, 44 N.E. 1038
(1896) (false imprisonment).
92. Evans v. Berry, 262 N.Y. 61, 186 N.E. 203 (1933), reversing 236 App. Div. 334,
258 N.Y. Supp. 473 (1932). The Appellate Division's decision had prompted a New Yorkcentered Comment, Municipal Responsibility for the Torts of Policemen, 42 YALE L.J. 241
(1932). The initials on the Comment are "E.M.B.," those of the premier attacker of
immunity, Edwin M. Borchard, whose contributions are discussed in the next section.
93. Evans, supra note 92, 262 N.Y. at 70, 186 N.E. at 206.
94. Now N.Y. MuNic. LAW § 50-a (1954). A discussion of analogous statutory material
appears at notes 169-177 and accompanying text.
95. Berger v. City of New York, 260 App. Div. 402, 22 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (1940), aff'd,
285 N.Y. 724, 34 N.E.2d 894 (1941).
96. Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945).
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rules of law as applied

. . .

against individuals or corporations

97

That statute was the basis for recovery, accompanied by a remarkable piece of dictum, in the factually spectacular case of Schuster v. City
of New York,9" celebrated with the proper bardic rites in innumerable
law review notes. The plaintiff's decedent had supplied police with, information leading to the capture of Willie "The Actor" Sutton. The court
held that a cause of action was stated by an allegation of negligent
police protection, exposing the informer to a revenge killing. It noted that
Section Eight of the Court of Claims Act had "removed the bar that
previously prevented actions based on the negligence of police." But
it then proceeded to say that this kind of action was "not created by
waiver of governmental immunity, but by the common law," citing
American Jurisprudenceas authoritative writ on the "capacity of common
law for growth and adaptation to new conditions.""9
New York, then, had begun in the tradition of the ancien regime,
standing foursquare for immunity, had proceeded with the aid of statutes
to chop down the doctrine, and then had concluded that the rule of the
development was common law, rather than statutoryl
Thus far, jurisprudential progress has been shown under sharp
00
focus in three states which eventually outlawed the immunity doctrine.'
97. COURT OF C.Aims AcT ANN., Book 16 (Gilbert-Bliss 1947). The court noted
that the "gist of this waiver" had been operative since 1929.
98. Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958).
99. Id. at 83, 154 N.E.2d at 538-39.
100. New York has been selected because it broke the immunity barrier in several
significant police cases; Florida, because its landmark decision was a police case. Although
the Illinois Supreme Court eliminated the old distinctions in a school district case, this
was followed within a month by an appellate court holding of liability in a police case.
NEW JERSEY's progression is also worthy of reference in some detail because of its
partial destruction of immunity in a police case in 1960. An 1840 decision in a bridge
situation had supplied the usual governmental-corporate dichotomy. Freeholders of Sussex
Co. v. Strader, 18 N.J.L. 108 (1840). This idea was applied at the turn of the century in
the police case of Tomlin v. Hildreth, 65 N.J.L. 438, 47 Atl. 649 (1900) ("public service
from which [the city] derives no special benefit or advantage in its creative capacity").
For a discussion of general New Jersey developments on the immunity front in the thirties,
see Weintraub and Conford, Tort Liability of Municipalities in New Jersey, 3 MERCER
BEos. L. REV. 142, esp. at 172-73 (1934). For an example of the ferment in New Jersey
law in this area in the mid-fifties, see Kelley v. Curtiss, 29 N.J. Super. 291, 102 A.2d 471
(1954), rev'd, 16 N.J. 265, 108 A.2d 431 (1954).
Capsule reference also should be made to a development in the fifties in WISCONSIN,
which splintered governmental immunity by judicial decision in a non-police case last year.
In 1953, the Wisconsin court held a city liable on an allegation of wounds received from a
negligent shooting by a policeman, on the basis of a statute which said that
Where the defendant in any action . . . except . . . for false arrest, is a public
officer and is proceeded against in his official capacity and the jury or the court
finds that he acted in good faith the judgment . . . shall be paid by the state or
political subdivision of which he is an officer. Wis. STAT. ANN § 270.58 (1958).
The case was Matczak v. Mathews, 265 Wis. 1, 60 N.W.2d 352 (1953). Although the statute
is written in indemnification language, the court held the city of Green Bay directly liable.
See Larson v. Lester, 259 Wis. 440, 49 N.W.2d 414 (1951), which held that a village could
be "interpleaded" [sic] under the statute.
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We have seen New York shatter the old structure by a combination of
case law and statute, Florida on the verge of its crash through the barrier,
and Illinois at least showing the effects of criticism of the doctrine.
Before analyzing the recent judicial abrogation of immunity in several
states, however, it is apposite to turn to a discussion of the creation of
an intellectual climate in the law which has helped to produce these
breakthroughs.
II. A DOCTRINE UNDER FIRE: THE GUNS OF ACADEME
A. Borchard: The Man and His Work
Legal scholarship has great potential for impact on the life of
society, as well as making its more abstract contribution to that "eternal
sifting and winnowing by which alone the truth may be found." The
attack of Edwin M. Borchard on the problem of governmental immunity is a fine example of this impact. His kind of contribution was
not unique. But his particularized attack on a single problem area
symbolizes the best that legal scholarship offers, by showing how it
brings to bear new ideas on specific problems. It also demonstrates anew
the close relationship of the law and the social sciences, of which the law
is properly counted as one. It is no accident that the historian Charles
Beard, in the opening chapter of his heretic Economic Interpretation of
the Constitution footnoted an article by the young Borchard as a notable
exception to the neglect by legal scholars of the need for research into
economic realitieslO°a
The usual general treatments of United States intellectual history
select Holmes and Pound as their symbols from the law.' 0 ' Edwin M.
Borchard was a fit member of the phalanx which those giants led, a
lawyer who directed original scholarship in practical paths. He, too,
represents the ferment of American intellectual life in general and law
in particular in the twentieth century.
Edwin Borchard began his attack on governmental immunity in
1924, a time by which he had already demonstrated impressive scholarly
credentials. First educated as a lawyer, he served as law librarian of
Congress over a five-year period, both before and after receiving his
doctorate from Columbia in 1913. He interrupted his term in that position to serve for a year as assistant solicitor of the State Department.
He was also chief counsel for Peru in an arbitration dispute before his
appointment as professor at Yale Law School in 1917."02
100a. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 7 & n.2 (1952) (first published 1913).
101. E.g., COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND, ch. XVIII (1958); CURTI, THE GROWTH
OF AMERICAN THOUGHT 571-72 (2d ed., 1951); PERSONS, AMERICAN MINDS, ch. 15 (1958);
WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM, esp. ch. V (1949).
102. His degrees were: LL.B., New York Law School, 1905; A.B., 1908, Ph.D., 1913,
Columbia. Biographical information from WHO'S WHO iN AMERICA, 1942-43.
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Travel in "some twenty countries in which the civil law prevails, 1 4
and deep study of comparative jurisprudence, notably that of Germany, "
had confirmed to him the thesis of Pound that the common law was
05
continuing to apply "archaic rules to modern economic conditions."'
He had become convinced that it was German jurists who were bringing

to active realization Holmes' declaration that the true science
of the law consists mainly in the establishment of its postulates
from within, upon accurately measured social desires, instead of
tradition. 0 6
In 1918, he had begun another major campaign, for "Declaratory
Judgment-A Needed Procedural Reform,"' 07 a work which was to be
as monumental as his battle against immunity.
Borchard's attack on governmental immunity was not the first burst
of academic fire against the doctrine,' 08 but it was the first cannonade
with a truly resounding effect. He poured out a total of eight articles

s
in the Yale and Columbia Law Reviews from 1924 to 1928,o a slashing

away at immunity fron his broad-gauged background. His articles encompassed a powerful and detailed survey of relevant political, philosophical and legal literature, both ancient and modern.
It is useful to examine this attack with brief reference to the remarks
of two great thinkers whose work was begun while Borchard was still
in college. One of the foundation blocks of modern physics was laid in
1900 when Max Planck formulated the Quantum Theory. Planck, who
ranks with Einstein in the gallery of the heroes of physical science,
later expressed part of the significance of his formulation" 9 this way:
BORCHARD, Some Lessons From the Civil Law, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 570, 571 (1916).
104. See, e.g., Borchard, Jurisprudence in Germany, 12 CoLumn. L. REV. 301 (1912).
Borchard's books included his GUIDE TO THE LAW AND LEGAL LITERATURE OF GER-MANY

103.

(1911);

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONTINENTAL LAW

MATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1915);

(1913); THE Dn'LO-

COMMERCIAL LAWS OF ENGLAND,

SCOTLAND,

GERMANY AND FRANCE (Co-author 1915); GUIDE TO THE LAW AND LEGAL LITERATURE OF
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND CHILE (1917). Other early articles included Bibliography of German

Law, 1 A.B.A.J. 141 (1915), and European Systems of State Indemnity for Errors of
CriminalJustice, 3 J. CRM. L. REV. 684 (1913).
105. Borchard, Jurisprudence in Germany, 12 CoLtrm. L. REV. 301, 302 (1912). At
this point Borchard cited half a dozen of Pound's germinal articles.
106. Jurisprudencein Germany, supra note 105, at 304.
107. This was the title of an article in 28 YALE L.J. 1, 105 (1918). The same year
Borchard published the first edition of his book, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS.
108. At least one earlier article deserves mention: Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal
Corporations, 4 ILL. L.Q. 28 (1921), which is cited today in some progressive decisions.
stimulated" by
However, it is generally true that "widespread interest" was "first ...
Borchard. See Repko, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 214 & n.3 (1942).
108a. Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25) ; Governmental
Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-27); Governmental Responsibility
in Tort, 28 COLUm. L. REV. 577, 734 (1928). These articles are cited hereafter only by
volume and page number. Borchard borrowed from the language of the articles in
34 YALE L.J. for Governmental Responsibility in Tort-A Proposed Statutory Reform,
11 A.BA.J. 495 (1925), in which he detailed a proposal for federal tort claims legislation.
109. Planck made the revolutionary assumption that radiant energy is "emitted not
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The establishment of this hypothesis involved a fundamental
break with the opinions hitherto held in physical science;
because until then it had been an accepted dogma that the state
of a physical picture could be indefinitely altered.110
Within a decade after Planck's publication of the Quantum Theory,
William James published his series of lectures and essays on "Pragmatism." James said that the "pragmatist way of seeing things" owed
"its being to -the break-down which the last fifty years have brought
in the older notions of scientific truth." It used to be said that "There
is an eternal and unchangeable 'reason' . . . . So also of the 'laws of
nature,' . . . so of natural history classifications." But now, James wrote,

scientific laws were treated as so much " 'conceptual shorthand,' true
so far as they are useful but no farther. .

.

. [O]ur whole notion of

scientific truth [is] more flexible and genial than it used to be."'

With this approach in mind, we may more fully appreciate Borchard's opening salvo. The idea that the "king can do no wrong," he
said, may have been somewhat mitigated by allowing an action against
the officer, and against the corporation engaged in its "corporate
function."
[But] no serious effort has been made to penetrate the mysticism encumbering this department of the law and to relieve
it of its theological and metaphysical conceptions and misconceptions." 2
Again, concluding the sixth article of the series, Borchard returns to this
theme, speaking of the need for "emancipation from dogma and metaphysics.""
This concern with the constrictive nature of pre-conceived notions
is underlined when Borchard zeroes in on municipal corporations:
In few, if any, branches of the law have the courts labored more
abjectly under the supposed4 inexorable domination of formulas,
phrases and terminology."
We are given no more reason for the adoption of a maxim deriving
from monarchical theory, he says, than the "antiquity of the legal
result."115
in an unbroken stream but in discontinuous bits or portions which he termed quanta."
Claiming no expertise in this most technical of subjects, I am indebted to the popular
treatment of Lincoln Barnett, THE UNIVERSE AND DR. EINSTEIN 23 (Mentor 1957).
110. (Emphasis added.) PLANCK, WHERE IS SCIENCE Gono 58 (1933).
111. The quoted passages are from James' essay, Humanism and Truth, reprinted in
PRAGMATISM AND FOUR RELATED ESSAYS SELECTED FROM THE MEANING OF TRUTH 375-77
(1947).
112. 34 YALE L.J. at 2.
113. 36 YALE L.J. at 1100.

114. 34

YALE

L.J. at 129. Borchard devoted a section to police problems at 34

YALE L.J. 240.
115. 36 YALE L.J. at 41.
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The "analytical jurist," as opposed to the "sociological jurist," seeks
refuge in a word-"sovereignty." In doing so, he manifests the "elemental instinct to seek a First Cause behind the chain of human phenomena."" 6 But the "sociological jurist seeks to explain the behavior of
and for him form is subordinated in imsociety and its institutions,
7
portance to substance."1
America lags, Borchard complained, while French and German
jurists dissect their institutions and "vie with one another to find sup'
porting theories consistent with modern legal and political conceptions.""
Throughout his writings there is this overriding, vigorous insistence on the
idea that the twentieth century is demanding new solutions to new
problems.
Borchard tied up his own academic watch on the Rhine with James'
formulation of a Pragmatism for Americans:
The problem in Europe is pragmatic-how far does public policy
and social theory require that the state and other public corporations shall assume responsibility for the injuries inflicted by
its agents on private individuals, a problem which requires no
metaphysical speculations into the nature of sovereignty, of
law and of the State."'
Borchard was unconcerned with whether the theory used to justify
recovery was respondeat superior, or social risk-spreading. Whichever one
was selected,
[W]e should not be perverse in insisting upon our defective
social engineering in the face of the experience of most other
civilized countries. . . . The community . . . will meet the
exigencies of modern organized life by discharging what the
rest of the world recognizes as just obligations. 2 '
In these words the nub of the man's thinking is spelled out explicitly or clearly implied: History is not a. deep freeze for the law.
Legal concepts should not be sanctified. The lawyer deals not with a
dead mechanism, but a live society which demands intelligent engineering.
116. 36 YALE L.J. at 1041.
117. Id. at 1040.
118. 28 CoLum. L. REV. at 773. See also 36 YALE L.J. at 804: "Jurists of France and

Germany find it almost incredible that a civilized country should still act on the principle
that the government is immune from the jurisdiction of its courts or that it assumes no
responsibility for the torts of its agents."
119. (Emphasis added.) 36 YALE L.J. at 1100. Cf. Borchard, 36 YALE L.J. at 757,
jumping with scholarly glee upon Mr. Justice Holmes' remark in Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) that
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception of obsolete
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right

as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
120. (Emphasis added.) 34 YALE L.J. at 258. (Borchard had credited Dean Pound with
the phrase "defective social engineering," 34 YALE L.J. at 3.
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Implicitly, urban society presents a dramatic change in living conditions
which demands dramatic solutions. Society should redress injuries inflicted by its agents. And, above all, problems should be solved pragmatically, without regard for the sorcery of old labels and ancient
concepts.
B. Points of the Intellectual Compass
We have seen Borchard's debt to Pound"' and to Holmes. 2 We
may note also his strong intellectual kinship to the quasi-scientific method
which Brandeis applied to the law,'-8 and to the approach of Cardozo
to creative jurisprudence." 4 But if it is obvious that Borchard's plea
for governmental responsibility is a significant treatise in the development
of American law, it should be noted briefly that it is something more.
It is a document in the intellectual history of the United States.
By the 1920s, a wide-ranging "revolt against formalism"' 25 was
progressing across the spectrum of the social sciences. The nature of this
revolt is emphasized by an analysis of just the articles in the two numbers
of the Yale Law Journal for which Borchard mounted his attack on
immunity. The impressive list of lawyers alone who contributed to these
issues... is supplemented by such names as that of the economist John
R. Commons.2 7 Further, we find Borchard in one of his articles citing a
121. See note 105 supra.
122. See text with note 106 supra.
123. Borchard's awareness that other members of the Western family of nations
were showing the way in many areas of jurisprudence bears an obvious relationship to
the original "Brandeis brief." That technique had used data gathered from European as
well as American committee reports, statistical compilations and statutes. See n.1 in
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1916).
124. There is significant historical coincidence in the publication of the first of Borchard's
articles on governmental responsibility in tort in the same year as Cardozo's THE GROWTH
OF THE LAW. Cardozo the judge speaks perhaps more judiciously than Borchard when
he cautions that the jurist may not destroy "the patterns of history and reason." But the
focus is the same when he stresses that the judge also must not bow to a "metaphysical
concept" or an "historic datum," and "shut [his] eyes to living needs." THE GROWTH OF THE
LAW 76 (1924).
125. The phrase is that of Morton White, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT
AGAINST FORMALISM (1949). White describes the members of this movement as men who

were convinced that
logic, abstraction, deduction, mathematics, and mechanics were inadequate to
social research and incapable of containing the rich, moving, living current of social
life. Id. at 11.
126. This list reads like a roster of a prep school for law school deans, judges and
influential government officials: A.A. Berle Jr., Charles E. Clark, Walter Wheeler Cook,
Arthur Corbin, Felix Frankfurter, Leon Green, Robert M. Hutchins, James M. Landis, David
Lilienthal, Wesley Sturges. These men were unified by their attack on conceptualistically
rigid ways of thinking, and by their insistence that the law keep pace with its environment.
For a later political application of this dynamic new approach, a classic example is
LILIENTHAL, TVA: DEMOCRACY ON THE MARCH (1944). The interrelation between the methods

of these legal scientists and those of physical scientists is dramatized by the role of Cook,
who had a scientific background. For an example of a bridge of the gap, see Cook's
Eugenics or Euthenics, 37 ILL. L. REV. 287 (1943).
127. Law and Economics, 34 YALE L.J. 371 (1924).
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book by Commons as well as an article by John Dewey in a contemporary
issue of the Yale Law Journal.'28
This is of great interest because Dewey was at least the nominal
leader of the muscular intellectual movement which was stripping away
the old mumbo-jumbos from the social sciences, and Commons was a
member in good standing of that movement. Dewey's gnarled but
tenacious prose pointed out the necessary linkage between the new
disciplines which were studying the problems of man in society. 2" He
viewed the universe as one without "fixed ends," demanding revision, expansion and alteration of old rules. " ' These ideas reverberated in the
pages of Cardozo,"' demonstrating the existence of a confederated elite
of intellectuals, taking their text from the same font.
The same revulsion against dogma was evident in the writing 133
of
historians like Charles Beard132 and economists like Thorstein Veblen
and in the mordant criticism of H. L. Mencken. 3 This throbbing in the
social sciences was matched by the recognition of the physicist that his
research was forcing a "fundamental revision of the whole doctrinal
structure," as Max Planck wrote in a remarkable passage, which is
quoted in full in the margin."' A dynamic approach to research in
128. Borchard in 36 YAMo L.J. at 779 n.59, citing Dewey, Historical Background of
Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926), and CoMMoNs, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM

(1924).

129. [M]orals based upon concern with facts and deriving guidance from knowledge of them would at least locate the points of effective endeavor and would
focus available resources upon them. . . . [This kind of study] would find the
nature and activities of one person coterminous with those of other human beings,
and therefore link ethics with the study of history, sociology, law and economics.
DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT 12 (1922).

130. Id. at 232, 239-40.
131. For the lawyer as for the moralist, the generalizations that result from the
study of social phenomena are 'not fixed rules for deciding doubtful cases, but
instrumentalities for their investigation, methods by which the value of past
experience is rendered available for present scrutiny of new perplexities.' . . .
'The problem,' in the words of Dewey, 'is one of continuous, vital readaptation.'
THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 84-85 (1924),

quoting Dewey, op. cit. supra note 129,

at 240-41.
132. See, e.g., Beard's conclusions at 290 of his EcONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1952) (first published 1913) (since "the holders of

personalty saw in the new government a strength and defence to their advantage," this
economic interest "must have formed a very considerable. dynamic element" in ratification).
133. See, e.g., the sardonic reference to the "doctrinal consistency and loyalty to
tradition"

of the "certified

economists."

THE

ENGINEERS AND

THE PRICE SYSTEM

129

(1944 ed.).
134. See, e.g., Mencken's reference to the "slow accretion of ideas that somehow
manage to meet all practicable human tests." It is risky to call even these ideas "absolute
truths," Mencken crackled; "all that one may safely say of them is that no one, as
yet has demonstrated that they are errors." PREjUDICES, Third Series 93-94 (1922).
135. [N]o doctrinal system in physical science, or indeed perhaps in any science,
will alter its content of its own accord. Here we always need the pressure of outer
circumstances. Indeed the more intelligible and comprehensive a theoretical
system is the more obstinately it will resist all attempts at reconstruction or
expansion. And this is because in a synthesis of thought where there is an all-round
logical coherence any alteration in one part of the structure is bound to upset
other parts also. . . . [S]trong pressure must come from a well-constructed body
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physics begot the atomic age. 116 The same approach in the humanistic
sciences wrought radical surgery on the old doctrines, and created
proposals for reform on dozens of fronts.
This whole movement was led by a splendid corps of intellectuals,
obviously united in a lucid, if loosely organized attack on dogma 87 and
label-worship. 8 ' It is in the context of his broad intellectual battle that
we should consider this single brilliant sortie of one man, Edwin M.
Borchard, a symbol of the legal scholar at his best. The effects of his
fight where judgments are won and lost supplies our next chapter. The
battleground now shifts back from the law reviews to the courts.
III.

THE BARRIERS CRUMBLE: BREAKTHROUGH CASES

A legal idea may be a truism to the scholar and at the same time a
heresy to the "practical" lawyer. Borchard destroyed the immunity doctrine in print in the twenties, but there is a lag between scholarly
proposal and judicial disposal. The leading subsequent articles of the
thirties and forties indicate this lag by their impatient tone.'8 9 But a fully
articulated judicial attack on the doctrine had to wait until the fifties.
We will now examine explicit judicial breakthroughs against governof theory which has been firmly consolidated by the test of experimental research.
It is only thus that we can bring about the surrender of theoretical dogmas hitherto
universally accepted as correct. And thus only can we succeed in forcing a fundamental revision of the whole doctrinal structure. Following a reconstruction of this
type there invariably arises a fresh series of problems for experimental research to
tackle. It is in the tackling of these problems that new ideas are suggested which
subsequently lead to the formulations of further theories and hypotheses. PLANCK,
WHERE IS SCicNcx Gomic 44-45 (1933).
136. For a cross-reference to literature, providing a poetic exercise in prophecy, see
Henry Adams' articulation in 1907 of the demands made on both social and scientific
ingenuity by the sudden revolution in human thought. Adams wrote then that thought
was "caught and whirled about in the vortex of infinite forces," that "power leaped from
every atom" and man "could no longer hold it off," and that "impossibilities no longer
stood in the way." THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAS 494 (Modern Library 1931) (first
printed privately, 1907).
137. Compare Holmes' warning against "supposing, because an idea seems very familiar
and natural to us, that it has always been so." THE COMMON LAW 2 (1945) (first published
1881).
138. See James' critique of the use of "solving names," PRAGMATISM 52-3 (1907). James
wrote that pragmatists could not look on any word as "closing [the] quest. You must
bring out of each word its practical cash-value, set it at work within the stream of your
experience. It appears less as a solution, then, than as a program for more work, and
more particularly as an indication of the ways in which existing realities can be changed."
Id. at 53.
139. Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort, 19 VA. L. REV. 97, 120
(1932) ("consummation" of the elimination of "glaring inconsistencies" should not be
"indefinitely delayed"); Casner & Fuller, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HnAv.
L. REV. 437, 462 (1941) ("Haven't we waited long enough for the elimination of this
absurdity from the law?"),; Green, Freedom of Litigation (III): MunicipalLiability for Torts,
38 ILL. L. REV. 355, 379, 381 (1944) ("atrophy" of judicial process in courts "embarrassed
and . . . even humiliated by doctrines that cannot be defended, yet hesitant to write
them off as having served their day.").
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ment immunity in tort during the last decade. Several of these breaches in
the wall of immunity have been made in policeman situations while
others have come in non-police cases. Although this analysis uses police
cases as a research vehicle to maintain a relatively sharp focus, it is
best to analyze all of the breakthrough cases together, in order to
compare factual situations and judicial techniques.
A. Rumblings
First, brief notation should be made of two older cases which seem to
have abrogated the doctrine temporarily. In 1896, Kentucky found a
town liable for an arrest and imprisonment under an unconstitutional
peddler by-law. Although this seems a clear exercise of "police" and
therefore, under the old rubric, "governmental" power, the court apparently thought that the power exercised was "corporate," because it
said that the by-law was "enacted for the sole benefit of the municipal
corporation . . . and of its citizens.' x40 In any event, the case soon was
4
overruled.1 1
An Ohio decision of 1919, Fowler v. City of Cleveland,'4 2 held the
city liable for the plaintiff's injuries when he was hit by the fire department's hose truck. The court noted a "growing dissatisfaction with any
comprehensive rule (and its satisfactory and unjust results) which exempts municipalities from liability for all acts which have been loosely
classified as governmental," and noted that this was a "purely ministerial
act." It may be observed that this was five years before Borchard's first
article on the subject. However, three years later the Ohio Supreme Court
expressly overruled its Fowler decision in a case involving the alleged
negligence of the city's patrol wagon driver. The court reverted to doctrinal language, saying that "all of the cases fall into two divisions"governmental and proprietary-and that police functions are governmental. 43
140. McGraw v. Town of Marion, 98 Ky. 673, 680, 34 S.W. 18, 20 (1896). The court
seemed primarily concerned with the idea that if the policemen were acting for the benefit
of the town,
it would seem unjust to them that they alone should be responsible, and it would
likewise be unjust to the injured party to require him to look alone to a few
individuals for redress in such cases. Id., at 678-79, 34 S.W. at 20.
Contrast the views analyzed in notes 37a-37b supra and accompanying text.
141. See Hershberg v. City of Barbourville, 142 Ky. 60, 133 S.W. 985 (1911).
142. 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919). See especially the concurring opinion
of Wanamaker, J., who eschewed "ministerial" rationalizations, said frankly that here was
a governmental function, and stressed that the issue concerned a struggle between the
ideas of Louis XIV and those of the Declaration of Independence and the Ohio Bill of
Rights. Section 16 of the latter document provided that "All courts shall be open, and
every person, tor any injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation shall
have remedy by due course of law."
143. Aldrich v. City of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922).
Wanamaker, J., dissented. The majority opinion in Aldrich was written by the lone dissenter
in Fowler, supra note 142. This was Jones, J., who had said in Fowler that that case
overruled "established legal principles heretofore enunciated by this court." But cf. City
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Mention should also be made at this point of the progression,
detailed earlier, of New York, which as early as 1945 had construed a
statute to eliminate the claim of governmental immunity for police
torts. 44

B. The Flood Tide
1.

FLORIDA

Florida was the first state to shatter the old barriers explicitly. Its
decision in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach.4 . was a fitting cap to
the liberal trend of decisions previously discussed. 146 The court here
allowed recovery for the death of a prisoner suffocated because of a
jailer's negligence. Making its bow to scholarly attacks on immunity,14 a

it buttressed its decision with several reasons, including these: The city
is analogous to a large business institution, an "incorporated organization
which exercises . . . powers primarily for the benefit of people within

the municipal limits who enjoy the services rendered pursuant to the
powers."' 4 7 There should be a remedy for every wrong, and to deny
recovery against municipalities in this kind of case is to make a sham
of that principle. The "interest of justice" compels the decision (the
Hargrove court uses the word "justice" affirmatively at least three
times). The theory that the "king can do no wrong" should be exorcised
from the law as fully as the Declaration of Independence and the Revolutionary War removed it from political control over the colonies. The
antiquity of the landmark case of Russell v. Men of Devon'47 , defines the
magnitude of the historical error of immunity. The law is not static, but
rather the "product of progressive thinking which attunes traditional concepts to the needs and demands of changing times."' 48
The reader is compelled to note the awareness of urban reality, the
concern with justice, and the distrust of labels. Hargrove sounded a
keynote for the nation.
2.

ILLINOIS

Illinois joined the liability camp within two years, holding a school
district liable for injuries to a child caused by a bus driver's negligence.' 4 9
of Hamilton v. Dudley, 120 Ohio St. 127, 165 N.E. 713 (1929), construing Oxio REV.
CODE ANN. § 723.01 (Baldwin 1958) (§ 3714 GEN. CoDE) (statutory variation on the

"street" doctrine, allowing recovery).
144. See notes 90-100 supra, and accompanying text.
145. 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957).

146. See notes 70-85 supra and accompanying text.
146a. The court footnoted, inter alia, a Florida article which had demanded not only a
comprehensive legislative policy for municipal responsibility, but a judicial reexamination
of the old doctrine. Price & Smith, Municipal Tort Liability: A Continuing Enigma,
6 U. FLA. L. REV. 330, 353-54 (1953). Hargrove did not mention Professor Borchard, as
many of the sister states which followed did, but the above-cited article paid him its respects
in its first footnote.
147. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1957).
147a. 2 Term Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
148. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1957).
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The court blistered the traditional monarchical scapegoat, noted that
stare decisis was not "blindly inflexible," and said that school district
immunity was "unjust, unsupported by any valid reasons, and has no rightful place in modern-day society." Although the court limited its holding
to school districts, the opinion is a sustained attack on the whole concept
of governmental immunity. It uses extensive citation from legal writings,
which is a prime characteristic of several breakthrough decisions. 5 '
It also noted the statutory inroads which already had been made on immunity. This symbolizes another popular technique in this group of
decisions, the reference to previous "prunings" on the fringes of immunity
as a springboard for creative jurisprudence. 5"
The Illinois court added a new twist to the destruction of immunity.
It used the technique of prospective overruling; however, it made an
exception to grant recovery to the plaintiff in the instant case. This
device was not without its kinks. It created several problems with
reference to children injured in the same bus accident as the original
plaintiff. 52 It also caused a reversal of an appellate court judgment for
a plaintiff in a police-assault case, rendered less than a month after the
breakthrough decision. 5 However, as will be seen, the idea of prospective overruling has gained favor in other states.
3.

NEW JERSEY

New Jersey added its name to the list the next year, but with an
important reservation. McAndrew v. Mularchuk..4 concerned the negligent shooting of the plaintiff by a reserve policeman. The court held that
"where negligent acts of commission form the basis of the claim against
a municipal corporation," liability will be determined "on general principles of respo:ndeat superior." This was a large step forward for New
Jersey, which previously had limited liability to situations in which the
wrongdoer occupied such a position of general authority to warrant the
conclusion that the municipality itself acted. However, the case was to
149. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d
89 (1959).
150. E.g., the court cites the works of three authors, Professors Borchard, Green
and Harno, several times apiece.
151. The "pruning" metaphor is that of the Florida court in Hargrove, 96 So.2d at 132.
152. E.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 24 Ill.2d 467, 182
N.E.2d 145 (1962) (holding that the first Molitor's sister stated a cause of action).
153. Peters v. Bellinger, 22 Ill. App. 2d 105, 159 N.E.2d 528 (1959) (policeman on
thirty-day trial, with police record himself, beat plaintiff, destroying the sight of an eye).
The Supreme Court reversed, 19 Ill.2d 367, 166 N.E.2d 581 (1960). Having fixed a date
for immunity to fall against school districts in Molitor, supra note 149, the court said it
would be "impractical" to fix one effective date to abolish immunity for schools and
another for municipal corporations. The court did not reach the question of the "applicability
of . . . Molitor . . . to this case. .. ."
154. 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960).
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be criticized by at least one court which did not think it went far
enough.

155

4. CALIFORNIA
California joined the new movement with the affirmance of a judgment against a hospital district for the negligence of a hospital's staff.' 56
Emulating a now familiar pattern, the court quoted Borchard on the
"mystery of legal evolution" which had produced governmental immunity in America, and briefly bombarded the historical problems of the
rule. The opinion, significantly, was written by Justice Traynor, who
ranks high in the eyes of legal scholars for his conscious struggles with
the techniques and implications of creative jurisprudence. Justice
Traynor noted that the old doctrine was "originally court-made," and
that it had become riddled with exceptions. 157 He concluded, in approved
Cardozoan fashion, with an explicit declaration of the techniques of
judicial lawmaking:
[W]e make no startling break with the past but merely take
the final step that carries5 8to its conclusion an established legislative and judicial trend.

The California court immediately placed a limitation on this decision
in a case decided the same day, indicating that immunity had fallen only
with respect to "ministerial" functions.' 59
5.

MICHIGAN

Michigan now moved toward liability, but gingerly, and followed the
move with an apparent leap backwards. The rather timid bellwether case
6 ° involving the fall of the plaintiff's
was Williams v. City of Detroit,"
decedent down an unguarded elevator opening. The lower court held for
the defendant city, thus setting the stage for a curious judicial lineup.
Four members of the Michigan Supreme Court voted to reverse, three
voted to affirm-and one voted to affirm but to overrule immunity
prospectively. This four-to-four decision meant an affirmance for the
defendant, although five judges had announced their opposition to the
155. The Wisconsin court called this an "unwise limitation" in Holytz v. City of
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
156. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961).
157. He pointed out, for instance, that recovery previously had been granted when
the defendant was a city-and-county hospital, but had been denied for county and hospital
district hospitals. See Beard v. City and County of San Francisco, 79 Cal. App.2d 753, 180
P.2d 744 (1947).
158. Muskopf, note 156 supra, 55 Cal. 2d at 221, 359 P.2d at 463.
159. Lipman v. Brisbane Elem. School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465 (1961).
In this case, involving allegations of defamation by three of the defendant district's trustees,
the court said that the Muskopi erasure of immunity did not apply to this specific
"discretionary" function. However, it shied away from announcing full immunity for
every "discretionary" act. Rather, the court set up certain test factors, e.g., the extent
to which the government's liability might impair the free exercise of the function.
160. 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
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doctrine of immunity. In arriving at this bizarre result, the court followed techniques which were now becoming standard. Both the opinion
which would have reversed and the "swing" opinion attacked the old
distinctions and strict stare decisis, with the four-man opinion making
picturesque reference to the "frozen compass of the ancient past." The
outvoted majority made its bow to the law reviews, and particularly to
the contribution of Borchard. It noted previous inroads on the doctrine
in Michigan. It emphasized the possibility of public liability insurance
for governmental units. And by this time it was able to add the bandwagon ingredient-it was able to talk of a "major trend," citing the
landmarks from Florida, Illinois and California.
Whatever prospective effect Williams might have had was sharply
limited the next year by a "reconstituted court," which denied liability
against a school district for a child's injuries, caused by stepping into a
construction hole on school grounds.'' The majority apparently founded
its decision on the statutory reestablishment of school district immunity
after its temporary elimination by statute. But Justice Souris argued in
dissent that the majority was "reinstating the old common law doctrine."' 62 Michigan, to borrow a phrase, seemed at best stuck in midpassage.
6. WIsCONSrN

The next assault on the wall of immunity was mounted by a tiny
plaintiff who fell into a trapdoor at a Milwaukee "tot-lot"-a playground.
The Wisconsin court, which already had liberally interpreted a statute
to allow a direct suit against a city for police torts, 6 ' held the city
liable.' 6 4 It explicitly declared that it considered the abrogation of immunity to apply to all subdivisions of the state. The decision reflected a
deep sense of intellectual involvement in the immunity problem, which
the court called "knee-deep in legal esoterica: e.g., governmental function
v. proprietary function; relationship of governor to governed." Because
of the ingrained nature of the dogma, the court believed it necessary to
consider the origins of the doctrine and the critical assault upon it made
161. Sayers v. School Dist. No. 1, 366 Mich. 217, 114 N.W.2d 191 (1962). The
"reconstituted court" phraseology is that of Souris, J., dissenting.
162. The majority said that if it were "dealing with the obsolete 'king can do no wrong'
edition of governmental immunity established by the courts we should not hesitate to
strike it down," emphasizing that it was the legislature which had repealed and then
reestablished the doctrine of immunity for school districts. The majority said that the
fact that the school district bad bought insurance did not allow a judicial waiver of
immunity "in view of the intent of the legislature in reestablishing the defense."
However, Justice Souris said in dissent that those who signed the four-man opinion
to reverse in Williams, text accompanying note 160 supra, were dealing with governmental
immunity and not just municipal immunity. He said in effect that he could see the handwriting on the wall in a case which came after Williams and before Sayers, supra note
161, limiting the Williams holding to municipal immunity.
163. See note 100 supra.
164. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
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by both scholars and cases. The court noted previous Wisconsin statutory
and judicial exceptions to the doctrine, and emphasized that it had
originated judicially.
The court limited its decision to prospective abrogation, except
for the instant case, and stressed its concern that the "various public
bodies" make financial arrangements. It also imposed a limitation used
by Florida's Hargrove decision, i.e., that liability should not be interpreted as having been imposed for legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative
or quasi-judicial functions. Both of these limitations have proved to be
sources of litigation as to interpretation in other states.' 5
7. MINNESOTA
Minnesota dismissed the doctrine next-prospectively-and it was
clear from an elongated list of amicus briefs submitted by governmental
agencies that the trend begun by Hargrove had staggered the beneficiaries
of immunity. The Minnesota court's vehicle was a suit against a school
district for the injury of a kindergartner by a defective classroom
slide.16 a With proper corsages to scholars and recent breakthrough cases,
the court noted the antiquity of the origin of the immunity rule in the
case of Russell v. Men of Devon,165b and said that its continuance was
due principally to "inertia." It stressed the "injustices" which had been
perpetrated in the name of the governmental-proprietary distinction.
It cited its own previous declaration that a change in policy must come
"from the legislature," but now it said, in effect, that it had had enough
"injustice." However, it made its own bow to the legislature. Its exact
holding, in abrogating immunity prospectively, was that the doctrine
would no longer be available to the various state subdivisions after the
next adjournment of the legislature.
C. Legislation in Both Directions
Minnesota's limitation in this respect was noteworthy because by
the time of that decision, the legislatures had struck back already in
Illinois and California. Shortly after the Illinois court abrogated the
doctrine, the legislature enacted a bill limiting -school district liability
to $10,000 for each action, and granting complete immunity to counties,
forest preserves and park districts. 6 6 And California "re-enacted" the
165. As to prospective abrogation in Illinois, see text with notes 152-153 supra. As
to the limitation by function, see text with notes 207-208 supra.
165a. Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, __ Minn. -,
118 N.W.2d 795
(1962).
165b. 2 Term Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
166. (1) Counties: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 34, § 301.1 (Smith-Hurd 1960), amended in
1961 to provide for indemnification of sheriffs or deputies up to $50,000 (Supp. 1962);
(2) Forest preserve districts: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 57%, § 3a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1962);
(3) Park districts, including separate enactments for Chicago park district: ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 105, §§ 12.1-1, 332a, 491 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1962); (4) School districts and
non-profit private schools: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 821-31 (Smith-Hurd 1962).
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"doctrine of governmental immunity from tort liability

. . .

as a rule of

decision in the courts of this State.116 7 The California legislation was to
remain in effect until 90 days after the final adjournment of the 1963
legislature, which presumably would take a long and thoughtful look
at the subject.
Dean Pound's injunction four decades earlier seemed prophetic.
Though many judges had made significant progress, he wrote in The
Spirit of The Common Law, they
may not be asked to lead the present transition. They must go
with the main body not with the advance guard, and with the
main body only when it has attained reasonably fixed and varied
conceptions.'
Legislatures can emasculate creative jurisprudence. The Minnesota
court's answer may be discreetly sensible, from the historical long view
if not the needs of present plaintiffs.
It should be noted that several legislatures have enacted statutes
dealing with the tort liability of the state or its subdivisions. These laws
present a varied picture indeed, as the following examples will show.
A grand old man of the family is, of course, the Federal Tort Claims
Act. 11a The Washington legislature has consented that the state be sued
in tort "to the same extent as if it were a private person or corpora70
An ejusdem generis
tion,' 6 9 but this has been restrictively interpretedY.
construction has limited the application of a North Carolina law setting
up an Industrial Commission to hear claims against the State Board of
Education, the State Highway Commission, "and all other departments,
institutions and agencies of the State.''
Illinois carries on its statute books, concurrent with its present case
law against immunity

72

and the legislative reaction thereto,' 7 2 a a law

which provides for the indemnification of policemen by municipalities
for judgments recovered as a result of injuries to third persons, except
For discussions, see Comment, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 588, 593-94, 597, 600, 602-03 (1960),

and Hickman, Municipal Tort Liability in Illinois, 1961 ILL. L.F. 475, 476.
167. CAL. CIv. CODE § 22.3 (Supp. 1962).
168. PouND, THE SPIT OF THE COMmON LAW 191 (1921).

168a. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680 (1958). The claims authorized are for "negligent
or wrongful act or omission" of employees acting within the scope of their governmental
employment. The act specifically excludes acts done in connection with "discretionary"
ifunctions. It also excludes a list of intentional torts.
169. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.92.090 (1962).

170. See Macy v. Town of Chelan, 59 Wash. 2d 610, 369 P.2d 508 (1962). See also
Comment, 36 WASH. L. REV. & ST. BAR J. 312, 321 (1961).
171. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291 (1958), construed in Turner v. Gastonia Bd. of

Educ., 250 N.C. 456, 109 S.E.2d 211 (1959) (child struck by power mower operated by
school maintenance man; demurrer sustained on grounds that he was not a state employee).
172. See discussion accompanying notes 149-153 supra.

172a. See note 166 supra and accompanying text.
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when the injuries result from the policeman's "wilful misconduct."' 78
Connecticut has a similar law for the indemnification of "any [municipal]
employee" except a fireman. 7 4
The vehicle statutes are numerous. One group of states imposes
liability on the political subdivision for negligent operation by an employee. 7 ' Another state provides for the state attorney general to take
over the employee's defense, but with limitations on the government's
liability.

76

Several states authorize the purchase of automobile liability

1 77
insurance by the state or political subdivision.

D. Holders of the Maginot Line
This analysis has now considered the first wave of successful
assaults on the immunity barrier. Eight states comprised this vanguard:
Seven by case law and one, New York, by a hybridization of common law
and statutory development. About half of these states have abrogated the
old doctrine in cases involving the torts of employees other than policemen, so the focus has broadened temporarily to include those situations.
It is time now to resharpen the focus on policeman cases, and to consider
that strand of legal history as a reflection of the state of jurisprudence in
this area in the states which have held the line for immunity. Sixteen
states have done so in police cases over the decade 1952-1962-at least
two jurisdictions with a statutory basis.
Wyoming and South Carolina offered the fullest discussions of the
question with Florida's Hargrove7 8 case as a judicial protagonist. The
Wyoming case, Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer,179 concerned
the death of a man who was directed by the defendant town's policeman
to assist in the pursuit of a felon, without warning as to the danger of
the situation.
173. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24 § 1-4-5 (Smith-Hurd 1962) (indemnification limited by
§ 1-4-6 to $50,000 including costs in cities under 500,000-i.e., cities other than Chicago).
This section was originally enacted in 1941. Until 1945, it provided for indemnification only
for injuries caused "by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle" by a policeman. Id. at 192.
174. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-465 (1960), modified, 1962 Supp. at 49.
175. CAL. VaICLE CODE ANN. § 17001 (1959); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 9.1708(1), (2)
(1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
75 § 622 (1960) (municipality "jointly and severally liable"
with itsemployee).
176. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 3B (1958).
177. In. ANm. STAT. § 39-1819 (Burns, 1952); N.D. CEr. CODE § 39-01-08 (1960);
WEST VA. CODE OF 1961 ANN. § 494(6). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-25-8, -9 (1960). The
first
named section authorizes the state board of finance to require "all officials . . . of aln
departments" to purchase insurance. The second named section provides that the action
shall not be brought against the state or itspolitical subdivision but the operator of the
vehicle. The application of this section was limited in City of Albuquerque v. Campbell,
68 N.M. 75, 358 P.2d 698 (1960), in which the court said that the law was "not intended
to open the doors" to suit against municipalities, "at least where they were not otherwise
subject thereto."
178. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957), discussed fully in
text accompanying notes 145-148 supra.
179. 80 Wyo.33,338 P.2d 808 (1959).
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The Wyoming court met Hargrove head on. It analyzed that decision
closely, noting Hargrove's use of the English case of Russell v. Men of
Devon17 1a as a whipping boy. But, said the court, wrong scapegoat. Devon
mentions a citation in Brooke's Abridgement which denies liability.
Brooke died in 1558. Wyoming adopts English common law prior to
1607, therefore this is Wyoming's rule of decision, and "It is only by
statute that the doctrine should be abrogated." Had the court stopped
here, one could marvel only at its tragic waste of scholarship. But the
court was more precise in defining the object of its opposition: Courts, it
said, should not assume to base their decisions on "their own concept of
'sociological enlightenment' rather than await legislative reaction to such
claimed modern advancement."' 80 Thus, the statement of the father of
"sociological jurisprudence" that the courts "may not be asked to lead
the present transition 118oa is substantiated by a court, using his own
affirmative phraseology as judicial profanity.
The South Carolina court specifically granted a plaintiff-appellant
leave to argue against a long line of decisions, in a case concerning
allegations of injuries suffered during a wrongful arrest, aggravated by a
failure of the city's policemen to call a doctor. 8 ' The court reviewed the
history of immunity back to Devon, and up through its absorption into
South Carolina case law. It recognized the existence of Hargrove, but
said in effect that there was a place for the judiciary, and the judiciary
should keep its place:
This Court is not invested with the power to make laws ...
Since our Courts have over such a long period of time consistently followed the rule of immunity, it should not be changed
except through legislative enactment.' 82
The court salted away the decision with its consideration of the fact
that the city had a bond contract to indemnify itself "for the use and
benefit of the Police Department," against loss through failure of an
employee "to perform faithfully his duties." The court said that since
a municipal corporation can exercise only the powers expressly granted
or those necessarily or fairly incident to them, and since no statute
empowered the city to waive immunity, it could not be said that there
existed an implied power of waiver.
The cry of "Leave it to the legislature" has proved a popular one
with courts rationalizing their preservation of immunity during the last
decade. When a plaintiff alleged brutal police treatment after arrest,
179a. 2 Term Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
180. 80 Wyo. at 53, 338 P.2d at 815.
180a. See the remark of Pound quoted at text with note 168 supra.
181. McKenzie v. City of Florence, 234 S.C. 428, 108 S.E.2d 825 (1959).
182. Id. at 435-36, 108 S.E.2d at 828. Compare Cardozo's reference to the "shock in the
discovery that legislative policy has made the compound what it is." NATuRE oF rHE
JUDICIAL PaOcUSS 117 (1921).
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Oklahoma noted the argument that if the policemen could not pay
damages "an inequity would result," but said that if this were the case,
the remedy "lies with the legislature, not the judiciary." ' Montana
denied recovery for the negligent fatal shooting of the plaintiff's decedent
while the policeman was trying to arrest him, on the ground that the
immunity doctrine had become "fixed as a matter of public policy,
regardless of the reason upon which the rule is made to rest," and that
any change should come from the legislature.' The emphasis, which is
supplied, indicates the frozen nature of doctrinal thinking, even in the
second half of the twentieth century. The same argument is expressed in
a different fashion, plaintively, by Justice Cohen, concurring in a decision for the defendant in a Pennsylvania assault case. Complaining that
"no course has been charted to guide the courts," Justice Cohen said
that the "confusion" 8 5surrounding the case demonstrated the "urgent
need" for legislation.

The courts of at least two states have had a restrictive legislative
course chosen for them in recent police cases. Ohio dismissed an allegation based on injuries sustained by a woman when a policeman removed
her from a street in which she was lying at three o'clock in the morning
and took her to a hospital. The basis for the decision was an Ohio
Code provision that the defense that a municipal officer is "engaged in
performing a governmental function shall be a full defense as to the
negligence of .. .members of the police department engaged in police

duties.' 8. 6 A Georgia appellate court struggled in two cases with its
recognition that the "passage of time and changing conditions" could
establish new causes of action which "should not be denied simply because they have not been previously enforced."' 8

7

But it yielded in one

case to the legislature,' and in the other, decided in 1962, to a 1900
case precedent, as well as to the same legislative provision.8 9
Mississippi also indicated that it felt the pressure. It admitted
that "some writers criticize the doctrine," though emphasizing that "the
183. Grimes v. City of Henryetta, 208 Okl. 217, 254 P.2d 980 (1953).
184. Kingfisher v. City of Forsyth, 132 Mont. 39, 45, 314 P.2d 876, 879-80 (1957),
quoting Hagerman v. City of Seattle, 189 Wash. 694, 698, 66 P.2d 1152, 1154.
185. Stouffer v. Morrison, 400 Pa. 497, 502-03, 162 A.2d 378, 381 (1960).
186. Lawson v. City of Campbell, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 70, 129 N.E.2d 529 (Ct. App. 1953),
appeal dismissed, 161 Ohio St. 172, 117 N.E.2d 598 (1954), construing OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 701.02 (Baldwin 1958) (§ 3714-1 GEN. CODE).
187. City of Cumming v. Chastain, 97 Ga. App. 13, 102 S.E.2d 97 (1958) (assault by
shooting of plaintiff in attempt to "make sport" of occupants of the auto in which he was
riding).
188. Ibid., following GA. CoDE ANN. § 69-307 (1957): "A municipal corporation shall
not be liable for the torts of policemen or other officers engaged in the discharge of the
duties imposed on them by law."
189. Thomas v. Williams, 1065 Ga. App. 321, 124 S.E.2d 409 (1962) (plaintiff burned
to death in jail fire), citing as controlling Gray v. Mayor of Griffin, 111 Ga. 361, 36
S.E. 792 (1900), as well as the Code provision mentioned in note 188 supra.
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overwhelming majority of courts" favor it. It held a municipality not
liable for a policeman's assault and battery, with specific reference
to the "problems of public finance" that municipal liability would
bring. 9 ' As noted earlier, it is interesting that the financial argument
crops out explicitly more in these days of insurance than it did a century
ago. The Mississippi court said that any change would require legislation.
The other decisions for immunity, for the most part, are content
to place a rubber stamp on the past. Thus, it is said that it is
"established"''
and "well-settled"' 9 2 that there is no liability for torts
committed in the performance of "governmental functions." An especially petrified variation on this theme is found in a Kansas decision,
rendered the same year as Hargrove, holding the city immune from suit
for false arrest and imprisonment. This is the question-begging technique: There can be no doubt, the court said,
but that the maintenance and operation of a police department
is a governmental function as distinguished from proprietary,
thus clothing the municipality with immunity for acts of negligence or misfeasance of its employees engaged in carrying out
of such function. 193
The major premise of immunity is thus frozen into sanctified writ.
All that is necessary for the city is to establish that the tortfeasor was
a policeman, i.e., that he was engaged in a "governmental function."
This technique is evident in several other police immunity cases of
the last decade.' 94 It is used in police cases even by states that have
made thrusts into the land of liability. The Texas Civil Court of Appeals,
for instance, denied recovery when the plaintiff's decedent, severely
beaten by a third party, was imprisoned though in need of medical
attention. The city's marshal was "exercising police power," said the
court, and the city was not liable "for the damages caused by such negligence, under the doctrine of respondeat superior."'95 This is to be
190. Anderson v. Vanderslice, 240 Miss. 55, 126 So.2d 522 (1961). It may be noted
that on the facts, this was more a case involving the negligence of the city rather than
the application of respondeat superior. The policeman in question had been convicted
of murder, and had been held liable for several other assaults.
191. City of Bay Minette v. Quinley, 263 Ala. 188, 82 So.2d 192 (1955) (allegation
of negligence in maintenance of stairs leading to police offices).
192. Taulli v. Gregory, 223 La. 195, 65 So.2d 312 (1953) (malicious prosecution).
Accord, Brown v. City of Shreveport, 129 So.2d 540 (La. App. 1961) (assault after
imprisonment).
193. (Emphasis added.) Wommack v. Lesh, 180 Kan. 548, 550, 305 P.2d 854, 856
(1957).
194. Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. 1952) (dictum); Bucholz
v. City of Sioux Falls, 77 S.D. 322, 91 N.W.2d 606 (1958) (dictum); Johnson v. City of
Jackson, 194 Tenn. 20, 250 S.W.2d 1 (1952); Mayor of Morristown v. Inman, 47 Tenn.
App. 685, 342 S.W.2d 71 (1960).
195. Valdez v. Amaya, 327 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
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compared with Texas Supreme Court language in other contemporary
cases. 9 ' Similarly, Colorado used the label of "lawful governmental
capacity" to immunize a town against a false imprisonment action in a
colorful fact situation with an Old West flavor. 97 This case was decided
only two years before the Colorado court made an apparent temporary
recession from immunity in some non-police cases.' 98
Several courts, then, have held the line for immunity in police cases
without much comment. But others have indicated that they are feeling
pressure. This pressure comes from without, as is evinced by references
to cases such as Hargrove,as well as to the presence of scholarly lobbying
for reform. It comes also from within, from the judicial conscience, as
with the half-spoken admission of possible "inequity."' 99
IV. THE GROWTH OF POPULATION AND THE GROWTH OF THE LAW
The history of the law in the United States bears an obvious close
relationship to intellectual history in general. In analyzing the development of an attack on one legal problem, we have noted the relationship
of one man to his fermenting intellectual environment. The impact of
his writings and those of his colleagues has been explicitly recognized
in a series of lighthouse decisions across the land in the last six years.
It is, of course, obvious that there are many variables which have played
upon these decisions. The author has selected one such variable, which
is indicative of the pressure which social environment brings upon the
courts. This is the phenomenon of urban population development, surely
one of the great factors of our modern history, and one of the most
salient considerations in the growth of our law.
The tables on page 512 suggest in a tentative fashion a dramatic
relationship between certain facets of urban population and the question
of governmental liability in tort. The tables include a profile for nearly
half of the states of the Union. The eight states above the heavy dividing
196. See the decisions in Crow v. City of San Antonio, 157 Tex. 250, 301 S.W.2d 628
(1957) and City of Austin v. Daniels, 160 Tex. 628, 335 S.W.2d 753 (1960), both discussed
briefly at note 60 supra.
197. Walker v. Tucker, 131 Colo. 198, 280 P.2d 649 (1955). In this case, Walker
succeeded Tucker as town marshal. He got the town board to authorize the closing of
the highway in front of Walker's home-which prevented Tucker's dairy trucks from
taking the shortest route from the latter's home to the dairy. Although Tucker eventually
secured an injunction against the barricades, he first had a truck driven through them,
whereupon Walker arrested him. The action for false imprisonment was denied in a
reversal of a verdict for the plaintiff, on the authority of a 1936 malicious prosecution
case, McIntosh v. City & County of Denver, 89 Colo. 403, 55 P.2d 1337 (1936).
198. See, e.g., Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 136 Colo. 279, 316
P.2d 582 (1957). See also Note, 37 DICTA 133, 162 (1960), wherein the student author,
although attacking the general concept of governmental immunity, does not object to
"immunity being continued in the public safety areas," but says that it should not be
granted when officials "exceed their powers," specifically citing McIntosh, note 197 supra.
199. See text with note 183 supra.

LIABILITY FOR POLICE TORTS

line have been selected because each has abrogated the doctrine of
immunity in some significant fashion. As explained previously, several
of these states have done so with reference to policemen, but others have
acted concerning other subject matter. However, the illustration outweighs in significance what it lacks in this one area of perfect symmetry.
The sixteen states below the line are the states which by common law
(or common law based on statute in two instances) have continued in
the last decade to immunize municipalities for police torts.
The story of Table 1200 is that all but one of the states which have
ruled for liability are in the top half of the nation today with respect
to rank by percentage of population classified as urban. On the other
hand, the states which have preserved immunity along the policeman
strand of legal history rank predominantly in the bottom half. Ohio and
Pennsylvania, immunity states in the top half, have sagged in relative
rank since 1910. Texas, which has made a dramatic jump from 35th
to 10th, and Colorado, which has stayed even at 14th, have both showed
significant cracks in the wall of immunity. The table is particularly
interesting because of the years it covers. The left-hand set of figures
is from 1910, or the time of Pound's articulation of the ideas of
sociological jurisprudence, and a decade and one-half before Borchard's
articles. The year 1960 is three years after Hargrove, and finds breakthroughs being made all over the nation against immunity. Thus, the
states which have ranked or risen high over the last half-century in their
urban population percentage are those in which the seeds of heresy have
bloomed.
°1 All but
A similar picture manifests itself in Table II.2
one
"liability" state have more than fifteen cities of more than 25,000 population, while all but three "immunity" states have less than fifteen. The
immunity states which are out of line are Texas, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
As noted, Texas is flirting with liability. It is perhaps unnecessary to
rationalize the other two exceptions, except to point out that Pennsylvania has seen some savage intra-court battles over this issue
recently, 20 2 and to note the decline which Pennsylvania and Ohio have
shown in Table I ranking. It seems apparent that the more substantial
cities a state has, the more tendency its court will show to break down
governmental immunity.
200. U.S. CENsus oF PopuLArloN: 1960, Vol. I: Characteristics of the Population,
Part A, Number of Inhabitants, Table G, at xvi (Bureau of the Census 1961).
201. CoUTrY AND Crry DATA BOOx, Table 6, Cities, 476-575 passim (Bureau of the
Census 1962).
202. The steadfastness of a majority of the Pennsylvania court in the face of this
progressive tort concept is matched by that court's refusal to allow recovery in another
area of continuing ferment. For Pennsylvania's counterpunch to a long national trend
for liability for negligence without impact, see Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263
(1958).
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focuses on number of municipal police employees. It

virtually repeats the pattern of Table II. Cities in the liability states
employ larger numbers of policemen, with the exception of Minnesota,
than the immunity states, with the usual exceptions of Pennsylvania,
Ohio and Texas.
APPE NDIX

LIABILITY STATES

TABLE I:
Rank, according to
percentage of population
classified as urban
1910
1960

CALIFORNIA
FLORIDA
ILLINOIS
MICHIGAN
MINNESOTA
NEW JERSEY
NEW YORK

7
31
8
16
22
5
4

WISCONSIN

19 (43%)

24 (68%)

42
14
38
10
30
34
28
49
23
40
9
44
47
39
35
29

35
14
34
15
30
42
25
50
40
26
18
44
26
38
10
32

(61%)
(29%)
(61%)
(47%)
(41%)
(76%)
(78%)

4
13
5
16
29
2
5

(86%)
(73%)
(80%)
(73%)
(62%)
(88%)
(85%)

TABLE II:
Number of
cities with
more than
25,000
inhabitants

TABLE III:
Full-time
equivalent
police
employees of
municipalities

85
22
41
37
11
36
36
(each borough of
New York City
counted singly)
19

17,286
4,684
15,114
10,079
2,704
9,706
34,605

14
8
11
40
7
8
9
8
4
8
26
6
2
8
40
2

2,359
1,602
3,104
9,752
1,765
2,046
2,591
1,171
463
1,784
13,350
1,583
460
2,429
7,861
276

4,333

IMMUNITY STATES
ALABAMA
COLORADO
GEORGIA
OHIO
KANSAS
KENTUCKY
LOUISIANA
MISSISSIPPI
MONTANA
OKLAHOMA
PENNSYLVANIA
SOUTH CAROLINA
SOUTH DAKOTA
TENNESSEE
TEXAS
WYOMING

(17%)
(50%)
(20%)
(55%)
(29%)
(24%)
(30%)
(11%)
(35%)
(19%)
(60%)
(14%)
(13%)
(20%)
(24%)
(29%)

(54%)
(73%)
(55%)
(73%)
(61%)
(44%)
(63%)
(37%)
(50%)
(62%)
(71%)
(41%)
(39%)
(52%)
(75%)
(56%)

. These tables may teach that courts lag behind the demands of
social realities. However, they also indicate vividly that the courts
are, after all, respecters of the forces abroad in society. The scholars
were in the vanguard in the fight for governmental responsibility. But
it appears that for the judges, the clincher has been supplied by sheer
203. U.S. CENsus OF GOVERNMENTS: 1957, Vol. II, No. 2, Summary of Public Employment, Table 14, at 50-61 (Bureau of the Census 1958). These are the latest state-by-state
figures which could be found in this particular category. Their relationship to the statistics
in Table II makes it reasonable to assume that the later pattern is the same.
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weight of urbanization."' Naked demography may not be suitable for
inclusion in appellate argument, but it would seem that it is at least
one persuasive factor in judicial decision. If the attorney cannot mention
it overtly, he should at least be aware of its implications.
V. THE LAW SEEKS A NEW

FOOTHOLD

The vanguard courts had barely solved one set of problems by
allowing actions where no action had existed, when new problems arose.
It is useful to analyze Florida for an example of the kind of issues which
the new solution posed. It will be recalled that the landmark Florida
decision of Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach"' found liability against
a municipality in a fact situation concerning a jailer's negligence. So
eager were plaintiffs' attorneys in Florida to test the ground under this
case that in a little over five years, a remarkable total of ten cases
involving intentional torts were decided at the appellate level. To analyze
these decisions is to examine the problems and challenges of common-law
jurisprudence in microcosm.
There are three intermediate appellate districts in Florida. THE
FIRST DISTRICT originally attacked the intentional torts problem by
dictum in a case involving allegations of assault and battery by an arresting officer. 6 The court then proceeded to limit Hargrove to negligence, by
indirection and strong dictum in two subsequent cases. It set down an
indirect limitation in Middleton v. City of Fort Walton Beach,2"' which
concerned an allegation that the plaintiff was arrested on a warrant that
both the issuing clerk and the arresting officer knew was void. Taking a
small leaf from Hargrove's book, the court noted that the supreme court
had said in Hargrove that its decision was not to be construed to apply
to "quasi-judicial" acts, and said that the acts involved here came under
that category. 208 By its characterization of the suit as one to "recover
204. The author is of course aware of the dangers attending the selection of any
variables as examples. Naturally, these particular tables include, sub silentio, a host of
factors attendant on urbanization. One may note informally, for instance, that the liability
states as a whole would be ranked as relatively sophisticated culturally. This factor
would present obvious implications for the life of the mind in general, and the judicial
mind in particular.
205. 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957), discussed in text with notes 145-148 supra.
206. Ragans v. City of Jacksonville, 106 So.2d 860 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1958). The court
affirmed a dismissal because of the plaintiff's failure to observe notice provisions. However,
it took occasion to say that the Jacksonville Charter provision immunizing the city
unless damage was attributable to "the gross negligence of the City" was void. The court
said that the Supreme Court had "specifically held that a municipality is liable for the
torts of its police officers under the doctrine of respondeat superior." It said that this
"clearly" meant that "municipal tort liability cannot be validly restricted solely to suits . . .
arising out of gross negligence." It would seem that more than one interpretation
may be placed on this statement, but the problem is moot because of the subsequent decisions
discussed in text accompanying notes 207-09 supra.
207. 113 So.2d 431 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1959).
208. This view is severely criticized in a thoughtful note, 14 U. MrAmi L. REv. 634
(1960).
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damages for an alleged intentional tort," and its italicization of the fact
that Hargrove involved a negligent tort, the court implied that this
distinction also influenced its decision. This implication was made
explicit in a subsequent decision in which the plantiff charged that a
Jacksonville policeman broke into his premises and searched them "with
209
great and negligent disregard for the plaintiff's right of privacy.
Holding the allegation sufficient on negligence-a holding perhaps worthy
of extended comment in itself-the court said by dictum "again that...
Hargrove ... should not be extended to include ... intentional torts."
It reiterated its disagreement to such an extension, which it said
it had expressed in Middleton.
THE SECOND DISTRICT examined the issue but did not cross
swords with it, in two dicta involving, among others, allegations of malicious prosecution. 10 Both decisions made a detailed review of case law,
both pre- and post-Hargrove, but the review concluded inconclusively.
In Gordon v. City of Belle Glade,21 ' the court noted the plaintiff's contention that Hargrove had accepted the liability-oriented dissents in the
previous Bethel and Williams cases. 12 It admitted that if this argument
were correct, those dissents "could be deemed controlling," because of
the similarity of the fact pattern in Bethel to the instant case. However,
the court said that Hargrove did not overrule these two predecessors.
Therefore, the issue remained undecided.
THE THIRD DISTRICT then proceeded to spice the stew pungently. It first considered a complaint of malicious arrest and unlawful
imprisonment, in City of Miami v. Albro.21 5 Although reversing and
remanding a verdict for the plaintiff on other grounds,214 the court said
baldly:
We . . . hold that a municipal corporation may be held liable
21 5
for torts of the nature alleged in the complaint now before us.
Within one year, the court apparently had backed up a bit from this
position. It reversed a plaintiff's directed verdict in the well-publicized
case of City of Coral Gables v. Giblin,216 which concerned the arrest and
imprisonment of the wife of a Dade County circuit judge. The court
209. Thompson v. City of Jacksonville, 130 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
210. Calbeck v. Town of South Pasadena, 128 So.2d 138 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961), and
Gordon v. City of Belle Glade, 132 So.2d 449 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
211. Supra note 210.
212. City of Miami v. Bethel, 65 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1953), and Williams v. City of Green
Cove Springs, 65 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1953), both discussed at text with notes 78-84 supra.
213. 120 So.2d 23 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
214. The plaintiff had contended that his action rested on the use of excessive force,
regardless of the validity of the arrest. The court, reversing with leave to amend on that
point, said in effect that the legality of the arrest was crucial.
215. City of Miami v. Albro, 120 So.2d 23, 27 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
216. 127 So.2d 914 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
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based its decision on an old judicial saw, the idea that the city could
not authorize an "illegal act," for example, an arrest outside its territorial limits. 217 The court was compelled to note both the city's contention that Hargrove did not extend to intentional torts, and Mrs.
Giblin's contention that it did. It concluded that "Certainly some of the
language of that decision supports the appellee's view"1218 Judge
Pearson's remark in dissent that Hargrove had created a new need for
"markers"21 9 seemed understatement.
The markers were not long in coming. The Third District veered
initially toward the old ground of immunity. A two-man majority affirmed a judgment for the defendant per curiam in Sherwood v. City of
Miami Beach.2 ° Judge Pearson dissented briefly, saying that the case
involved "an intentional tort of a police officer for which the City can be
held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior." A Third District
panel ostensibly confirmed this course in its refusal a few weeks later
to answer a certified question regarding municipal liability for a police
assault and battery.220 a
And then, just before this article went to press, the Third District
2 °
resolutely declared for liability. The vote in Simpson v. City of Miam S b
was divided, 22O c but the holding was unmistakable:
We hold, on the authority of Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach
. .. that the defendant municipality does not enjoy immunity
from liability for the intentional torts of its police officers committed in the course or scope of their employment. 22 0d
The court pinpointed the broad policy base of Hargrove, noting
that the supreme court in that decision had scorned the piecemeal "pruning" of immunity and had blasted the immunity concept as "archaic and
outmoded." It quoted the statement in Hargrove that "the time has
arrived to face the matter squarely in the interest of justice and place
the responsibility for wrongs where it should be." It refused to find
controlling significance in "a restatement of the holding in which [the
Hargrove court] used the word 'negligence.'" The significant limitation,
217. For nineteenth century beginnings of this device, see text with notes 53-54 supra.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third District in Giblin, but on a different theory, based
on the idea that there was a legal arrest and retaking. 149 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1963).
218. City of Coral Gables v. Giblin, 127 So.2d 914, 918 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
219. Id. at 922.
220. 148 So.2d 293 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
220a. See Jaworski v. City of Opa-locka, 149 So.2d 566 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). The
court said that it "does not appear that the question is without controlling precedent
in this state." It should be noted that the acts in question were alleged to have been committed after arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of
the arresting officer.
220b. Case No. 62-357 (Fla. 3d Dist., August 6, 1963).
220c. Judge Carroll wrote the majority opinion, joined by Judge Pearson. Chief Judge
Barkdull dissented.
220d. Simpson v. City of Miami, note 220b supra, at 4.
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the court said, is found not in "the nature of the tort, but in the nature
of the act, as to whether it is within the course or scope of employ22
ment.,, 0oe

The court emphasized that its holding was derived from Hargrove
"read in full. ' It declared explicitly that there was now a conflict among
the appellate districts, 2 ' thus inviting review at the supreme court
level. 222 In the view of this writer, Simpson sailed the true course. For
Simpson was the first time that Hargrove had been read as it was writ"in full."
When Hargrove was decided, it set the appellate courts of Florida
adrift on a lonely judicial sea; the old familiar landmarks were gone.
However, within half a decade, two of the three districts had found harbors on opposite shores. The better port appeared at the confluence of
two ideas, flowing from Hargrove and Simpson. One idea emphasized the
demands of justice in the context of a realistic appreciation of the nature
of the modern municipal corporation. The other argued the application
of established principles of respondeat superior to intentional torts. Experience and logic both pointed to liability.
One other problem has arisen in connection with police cases-the
provocative issue of municipal liability for a negligent failure to act. In
Florida, a pre-Hargrove police case22 3 and a post-Hargrove fireman
case224 indicate the scope of the problem. A dissenting opinion in an
Illinois appellate decision may point the way to new municipal responsi2 5 the plaintiff charged
bility. In that case, Adamczyk v. Zambelli,"
that
the city's policemen were negligent in failing to suppress the unlawful
explosion of fireworks by participants in a church parade. The majority
distinguished Illinois' breakthrough holdings in school district and
220e. Id. at 2. It may be noted that the blackletter law of
AGENCY § 245 (1958)

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
says: "A master is subject to liability for the intended tortious harm

. . . done in connection with the servant's employment, although the act was unauthorized,
if the act was not unexpectable in view of the duties of the servant."
221. The court cited Middleton, text with notes 207-08 supra; Thompson, note 209

supra; Calbeck, note 210 supra; and Gordon, text with notes 210-11 supra. It said that
"to the extent" that these cases "are decisions that Hargrove does not encompass intentional

torts, our decision in this case is in conflict therewith."
222. See FLA. CONST. art. V § 4(2).
223. Woodford v. City of St. Petersburg, 84 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1955). The plaintiff was
bowled over in his yard by some boys who organized a "flying wedge" to chase baseballs

from the nearby Yankee training field. He claimed that the police force was negligent
because it knew of the boys' custom and did not stop them. The pre-Hargrove court
reversed a dismissal, apparently on the grounds that proprietary functions were involved
in the keeping of a ball field. However, it said that its holdings at that time on strictly
governmental functions dictated that "a municipality should not be liable for the negligent
failure of its police force to act when action would appear to be indicated." Id. at 26.
224. Steinhardt v. Town of North Bay Village, 132 So.2d 765 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961)
(recovery denied on allegation of city's negligent failure to protect property from fire loss;
refusal to extend Hargrove).
225. 25 Ill.
App. 2d 121, 166 N.E.2d 93 (1960).
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policeman cases... by saying that they involved "affirmative negligent or
wilful acts by municipal employees."
But the dissenter, Justice Kiley, said that the case "calls for a further
step in the direction of the trend away from governmental immunity"
shown .by the Illinois breakthroughs. He did say that the fact that the
policemen had "furthered the violation" of a fireworks permit by "policing the parade" made the case "something more than mere omission."
Yet even if the case was not strictly a "failure to act," the dissent thrust
in the direction of allowing recovery for this kind of negligence.
Another new outrider had appeared in the attempt to extend the
frontiers of municipal liability for police torts.
CONCLUSION

We have now traced a single strand of legal history through more
than a century of development. That strand began on a dark and lonely
street in New Orleans when men were chattels. The law that was made
then was perhaps worthier of those times, but it survived to rule different
days and different conditions. The nationalizing forces of the Civil War,
the quickening of industrialism and the coming of the city as a potent
force in society were accompanied, ironically, by the acceptance all over
America of the idea that municipalities should be immune from suit for
the torts of police officers. With the coming of the twentieth century,
a few courts repudiated the immunity doctrine in certain areas, here
and there to recede but occasionally, as in the case of Florida, laying a
solid foundation for future progress.
Then there came an awakening in the schools of law, even as the
doctrine petrified into tradition. Bold men in those schools began to
say that the law should be responsive to the powerful forces which had
seized American life. This attack on the old legal ways was but a
facet of the mighty revolt against doctrine which swept the intellectual
community of this country and of the Western world, in all the social
and physical sciences. Like many of their cohorts, teachers of law
launched campaigns for reform in many areas. Their battles began in
the legal publications. A sterling example was furnished by the attack
on governmental tort immunity of Edwin M. Borchard, well-known where
the great minds of the law came together, but relatively unsung in the
general textual treatments of American intellectual development. He
attacked this problem passionately, writing from a background of broad
scholarship which encompassed the progress of European jurisprudence.
Then he literally carried his attack to the courts. Thus, we find him
presenting an amicus brief when a citizen is accidentally shot down
by a New York City policeman. Advocacy combined with scholarship
in this movement for reform.
226. See text with notes 149-153 supra.
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Combined with this attack from academe there came an increasing
urbanization. One may read between the lines of the cold census figures
the requirements which arose for more municipal services of every kind,
including police protection. The ramifications of this development inevitably must have set ablaze the fuel provided by the scholars. Thus,
we find New York, largest state in the nation, with the largest city,
quietly leading the way with an interesting amalgam of case and statute
liability for police torts.
And then, half a century after Dean Pound's germinal articles, four
decades after Borchard's focused attack, there begins a dramatic series
of decisions, burning with brush fire effect, to wipe away the old immunity. Ideas and the pressure of people had broken through. If there
remained a solid resistance movement, there were cracks even in the
status quo states.
The courts of the breakthrough states recognized the proddings of
scholars, the demands of simple justice and the trends of their own
decisions, and took a step forward in the perpetual renewal process that
is creative jurisprudence.. It appears certain that the highest courts of
the other jurisdictions must recognize the need for judicial initiative
against governmental immunity. When the proper case presents itself,
perhaps the Minnesota solution is best: Prospective abrogation with a
stay of execution for the doctrine until the adjournment of the next
legislature.
This technique presents legislators with a fait accompli, demanding
action against a deadline. However, it recognizes the need for legislative consideration of the entire problem area, 227 and its use may pay
sufficient deference to the legislature to avoid the kind of severe reaction
we have seen in California and Illinois. Failing legislative action, governmental units will at least be vouchsafed a period in which to make
insurance arrangements. The use of this method would seem to outweigh
in practical advantage what it may cost in individual hardship, one may
even say injustice.
Finally, the courts which make the inevitable break with the old
doctrines must look to the new problems which their decisions set boiling.
These problems appear in sharp focus in Florida, where the courts have
struggled valiantly for a new foothold, a new set of rules. A new sense
of judicial responsibility has created a new judicial birth of freedom. In
turn, freedom has produced more responsibility.
227. See POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 190-91 (1921).

